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1Abstract
This paper draws upon the media reports, congressional hearing testimony, and company
press releases to recount events surrounding the FDA’s refusal to issue a license to ImClone’s
cancer drug Erbitux, late in 2001. Erbitux was granted fast-track status by FDA, and was
evaluated under the agency’s accelerated approval process. Despite hype about the drug’s
eﬀectiveness in ﬁghting certain types of cancer, the FDA found numerous and considerable
problems with the licensing application, and in particular with the conduct and documenta-
tion of the main registration trial. The paper discusses the possibility that ImClone’s public
statements may have misled investors, and the ability of the FDA and the SEC to oversee
these disclosures. Finally, recent changes in the FDA approval process are addressed, as
well as the current state of ImClone’s continuing attempts to gain licensing approval for
Erbitux.
Part I: Introduction
The Erbitux Rollercoaster
On December 28, 2001, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration faxed a “refusal to ﬁle” (RTF) letter
to ImClone Systems, notifying the company that the FDA would not accept ImClone’s Biologics License
Application (BLA) for its cancer drug, Erbitux.2 Less than two weeks earlier, ImClone was named one of
seven biotechnology companies included for the ﬁrst time on the NASDAQ 100, and in the preceding months
Erbitux had been the subject of several glowing stories in Business Week, the L.A. Times, and elsewhere.
ImClone’s stock hit a high of $75.45 on December 6, and closed at $62.96 on December 21, just one week
before the Erbitux rejection, but by January 25, 2002 the price had fallen to $14.90, and it would fall further.3
Soon, ImClone would face a Congressional inquiry,4 an insider-trading investigation, and civil lawsuits, each
2Erbitux is the trademark name for a drug referred to by ImClone as IMC-C225 (or C225). The generic name for Erbitux
is Cetuximab.
3Dow Jones & Reuters, quotes available at http://www.factiva.com/. Also available at
http://table.finance.yahoo.com/k?s=imcl&g=d.
4On June 13 and October 10, 2002, hearings were held by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the Committee
on Energy and Commerce of the U.S. House of Representatives.
2seeking to determine how the FDA could dismiss a drug seemingly assured of passage. Hindsight is 20-20,
and to date nothing conclusive indicates ImClone’s management was anything less than convinced they were
working on the next miracle drug. Clearly, however, somewhere in the process, someone dropped the ball.
Bringing new drugs to market implicates not only eﬀorts by the company to secure the FDA’s approval, but
also a simultaneous eﬀort to make investors, and consumers, aware of the progress of research and develop-
ment. The valuation of biotechnology companies is largely based upon speculation about the future of the
drugs in the company’s pipeline, rather than current assets or sales. This type of speculation necessitates
considerable reliance on the company itself to provide accurate and timely information on the development
of products, and their progress towards the market.5 But the biotechnology industry also relies heavily on se-
crecy. When hundreds of millions of dollars are needed to bring a successful drug to market, companies must
take every precaution to ensure proprietary information does not leak to competitors. There is, therefore, an
inherent tension that exists between the market’s need-to-know, and a company’s need for conﬁdentiality.
Closely connected with this tension are two administrative agencies: the FDA and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission. The FDA is charged with reviewing company applications to ensure drugs that reach
the market are safe and eﬀective. Because of the potential sensitivity of the information the FDA must
review, Congress, and the agency itself, have limited what the agency may disclose to the public concerning
the substance of applications.6 By contrast, the SEC is responsible for ensuring that information that reaches
the investing public is as accurate as possible. The SEC’s regulations mandate that company disclosures
must be accurate and complete, enabling investors to accurately value companies. But in the context of drug
development, the SEC does not require, nor could it, disclosure of all the information received by the FDA.
The result is a regulatory quagmire: the FDA has the information necessary for investors to make informed
5See Geeta Anand & Chris Adams, ImClone Incident Spurs Demands For Greater Disclosure From FDA, Wall St. J., Jan.
25, 2002, at A14, quoting Steven Harr biotechnology analyst at Robertson Stephens.
6See FDA’s Authority to Monitor and Disclose Information, infra at page 26.
3decisions, but is not permitted to disclose that information; the SEC is responsible for policing disclosures,
often does not have access to the information necessary to do so.
In the case of ImClone, oﬃcials at the FDA were aware of the potential for company disclosures to mislead
investors well before the issuance of the RTF, but took no action to remedy the problems, while the SEC
only became aware of the problems after the damage was done. The intent here is not to point ﬁngers.
Much blame has fallen on ImClone’s co-founder and former CEO, Sam Waksal. Dr. Waksal pleaded guilty
last October to numerous counts of insider trading in the days before the Erbitux rejection,7 and several
stories have surfaced of numerous prior indiscretions committed by Waksal in the scientiﬁc community.8
Despite the press given to Waksal’s actions – and to alleged insider trading of Waksal’s family and friends
(most notably, Martha Stewart) – insider trading will be addressed only tangentially, in the context of what
circumstances made such trades possible. Rather, the paper seeks to determine where the process of drug
development and marketing – and the concomitant regulatory oversight – broke down, and what can be
done to improve it. Part II discusses the FDA approval process for biologics such as Erbitux, the content of
the Erbitux application, and the FDA’s grounds for rejecting it. In Parts III and IV an attempt is made to
determine whether either FDA or SEC had the authority and the opportunity, at the time, to take action
to minimize the shock to the market of the Erbitux rejection. Finally, Part V looks at recent changes to the
drug approval process, tries to determine how FDA and SEC might, separately or in tandem, work to avoid
similar debacles in the future, and considers the future of ImClone and Erbitux. It is important to remember
that, although the focus of the paper is on the development and rejection of Erbitux, the general scenario
occurs daily as pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies work to bring drugs to market successfully.
7Jerry Markon and Geeta Anand, Waksal Pleads Guilty as U.S. Widens Probe, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 2002, at C1.
8See infra Note 239 at page 60.
4The Hype and the Big Deal
ImClone was not simply tooting its own horn when it lauded Erbitux as the best thing since sliced bread; the
company was aided by numerous media outlets that picked up and dispersed the story of the cancer wonder
drug. In a piece of prophetic irony, just two days before the FDA issued its RTF letter, the L.A. Times
proclaimed “Erbitux ...is set to make one of the biggest splashes of 2002.”9 Several stories highlighted the
results of ImClone’s registration study that FDA later rejected.10 In an article about up-and-coming cancer
therapies, Time Magazine reported that the study “showed that the drug could dramatically boost the
eﬀectiveness of standard colorectal-cancer chemotherapy, shrinking tumors in more than a ﬁfth of otherwise
hopeless cases.”11 Business Week quoted an investor analyst who stated that the results announced by
ImClone “substantiate our belief that C225 [Erbitux] could be a blockbuster, with potential for $1 billion in
annual sales.”12 The magazine also ran a cover story on Erbitux in which it noted that the results of the
registration study were “unusually high in such sick patients” and that “the oﬃcial nod” was expected in
early 2002.13
The hype was not baseless; in addition to reported trial results, Erbitux is credited with the recovery of
several cancer patients in compassionate use programs.14 Shannon Kellum of Florida had two tumors, one
the size of a grapefruit and the other the size of an orange, that shrunk by 80 percent after she began
treatment with Erbitux, and were eventually removed surgically.15 Marilyn Caplan of New York had lung
cancer that spread to her liver and brain. In 1999 she began taking Erbitux, and her cancer went away.16
9Toni Clark, Biotech Industry Gaining Maturity Trends: There have been growing pains, but leaders have gained from their
challenges, setbacks and failures, L.A. Times, Dec. 26, 2001, at C3.
10A “registration study” is a clinical trial used to seek FDA marketing approval.
11Michael D. Lemonick, et al., New Hope For Cancer, Time Magazine, May 28, 2001, at 62.
12Gene G. Marcial, ImClone May Have a Cancer Blockbuster, Business Week, June 11, 2001, at 163, quoting Cory Kasimov,
analyst for Gruntal.
13Catherine Arnst, The Birth of a Cancer Drug, Business Week, July 30, 2001, at 46.
14Compassionate gives permits patients with no other options access to experimental therapies in some circumstances.
15Id.; Ron Winslow and Geeta Anand, Laboratory Mixup: A Novel Cancer Drug, A Big Biotech Deal, And Now a Bitter
Feud, Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 2002, at A1 citing report of May 2000 ASCO conference.
16Geeta Anand, Why ImClone’s Cancer Drug Seems So Promising, Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 2002, at B1.
5Others had similarly remarkable results.17
These types of responses no doubt contributed to Bristol-Myers Squibb’s (BMS) willingness to enter into a
$2 billion agreement with ImClone in September, 2001. BMS agreed to purchase 19.9 percent of ImClone’s
stock in a $1 billion tender oﬀer at approximately a 75 percent premium over the market price at the time
of the announcement.18 BMS also agreed to another $1 billion in milestone payments connected to Erbitux
development and commercialization.19 Internal BMS communications do reveal concerns about the Erbitux
BLA, and especially about ImClone’s assessment of the results of the primary registration study, which BMS
oﬃcials considered optimistic.20 Ironically, many of the concerns , would later be expressed by the FDA in
rejecting the Erbitux application. At the time, however, they were not enough to deter BMS from making
the deal.21
It was against this backdrop of glowing publicity and a billion dollars in new ﬁnancing that ImClone submitted
Erbitux to the FDA for marketing approval.
Part II: Erbitux and the FDA
The FDA Drug Approval Process in a Nutshell
The FDA approval process for new drugs, including biologics such as Erbitux, begins with the ﬁling of an
investigational new drug (IND) application seeking permission to conduct clinical trials on human subjects.22
17Id. See also Catherine Arnst, supra Note 13.
18An Inquiry Into the ImClone Cancer-Drug Aﬀair: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations of the Committee on Evergy and Commerce, House of Representatives, 107th Cong. (June
13 and October 10, 2002) (hereinafter Hearings) at 44 (Preliminary Committee Staﬀ Report) available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/06132002Hearing587/hearing.htm.
19Id.
20See What Really Went Wrong? infra at Page 53-54.
21Hearings, supra Note 18 at 44-45.
22Although drugs and biologics are approved under authority of diﬀerent statutory sections – 21 U.S.C. 355(b)(1) and 42
U.S.C. 262, respectively – the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 directs FDA to “minimize diﬀerences in review and approval”
6Prior to ﬁling a, however, a new chemical entity (NCE) will undergo years of laboratory and preclinical
research to determine, among many other things, what it does, and how it does it. Among the purposes of the
IND application are to ensure the safety of patients in future clinical trials, and “ensure the appropriateness
and scientiﬁc design of studies under the IND so that the IND review process may eﬃciently anticipate and
prevent problems which might arise” in later review,” and both of these concerns are taken into account
in deciding whether to permit clinical trials to proceed.23 At this stage, however, the agency’s primary
responsibility is to protect the safety of human subjects, and review of the quality of scientiﬁc evaluation of
drugs is focused in Phase II and III clinical trials.24
At the time of the Erbitux application, BLAs were reviewed by the FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation
and Research (CBER). Ordinarily, a new drug must pass through three clinical trial phases before it may
be submitted for marketing approval: Phase I clinical trials seek to determine the safety of the drug when
administered to (usually healthy) volunteers; Phase II involves small trials to determine the eﬃcacy of the
drug in patients with the target disease; and ﬁnally, Phase III requires well controlled trials of several
hundred, or even several thousand patients, to collect further pharmacologicol and toxicological data, as
well as detect adverse reactions and potential interactions with other medications.25 FDA has, however,
approved biological products “based on single, multicenter studies with strong results,” under regulations
for expedited approval.26 These regulations were codiﬁed, with some modiﬁcation, when Congress enacted
the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (Modernization Act).27
(section 123(f)), and for purposes of this paper the process is eﬀectively identical. Consequently, discussion of the “drug”
approval process applies to biologics unless otherwise speciﬁed.
23Hutt, Peter Barton, and Richard A. Merrill. Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials (2 ed.). The Foundation Press, Inc.
(New York, 1991). Pg. 515
24Hutt and Merrill, pg. 515, note 3 at 517.
25Hutt and Merrill, pg. 516.
26Food and Drug Administration, Guidance for Industry: Providing Clinical Evidence of Eﬀectiveness for Human Drug and
Biological Products (hereinafter “Providing Clinical Evidence of Eﬀectiveness”) 4, (May 1998).
27P.L. 105-115. See also Food and Drug Administration, Guidance for Industry: Fast Track Drug Development Programs –
Designation, Development, and Application Review (hereinafter “Fast Track Guidance”), (1998) at 1; ImClone Systems, Inc.,
Form 10-K 18 (2001).
7Among other things, section 506 of the Modernization Act sets out requirements for “fast track” designation,
and accelerated approval of drugs and biologics.28 Fast track designation is available for a product “intended
for the treatment of a serious or life-threatening condition [that] demonstrates the potential to address unmet
medical needs for such a condition.29 In reviewing an application for fast-track designation the burden is
on the applicant to meet these requirements, however FDA relies on summaries of data provided by the
applicant in evaluating the drug’s potential.30 This means FDA will not undertake an independent review
of the data in making a fast-track designation. The fast-track process emphasizes “the critical nature of
close early communication between the [FDA] and a sponsor,” including “eﬀorts by the Agency and sponsor
to reach early agreement on the design of the major clinical eﬃcacy studies that will be needed to support
approval.”31 In addition, fast-track designation seeks to further expedite the review process by permitting
the applicant to submit a BLA (or NDA for drugs) on a rolling basis, and authorizing – but not requiring –
FDA to begin review of an application prior to its completion.32
Products granted fast track designation may also be approved on an accelerated basis under section 506(b).33
The accelerated approval process permits approval of a license application “upon a determination that the
product has an eﬀect on a clinical endpoint or on a surrogate endpoint that is reasonably likely to predict
clinical beneﬁt.34 With respect to cancer, prior to the Modernization Act “FDA considered evidence of
partial tumor shrinkage ...insuﬃcient by itself to warrant approval.35 Since February 19, 1998, however, the
FDA has reversed course, and now considers products for accelerated approval based upon evidence of tumor
shrinkage.36 The Modernization Act also makes a signiﬁcant change to the traditional FDA approval process
2821 U.S.C. 506. See also Food and Drug Administration, Fast Track Guidance, supra Note 27 at 1.
2921 U.S.C. 506(a)(1) (1997).
30Food and Drug Administration, Fast Track Guidance, supra Note 27 at 7.
31Food and Drug Administration, Fast Track Guidance, supra Note 27 at 1. See also Hearings, supra Note 18 at 246.
3221 U.S.C. 506(c) (1997).
3321 U.S.C. 506(b) (1997).
3421 U.S.C. 506(b)(1) (1997) (emphasis added). See also Hearings, supra Note 18 at 246
35ImClone Systems, Inc., Form 10-K 18 (2001).
36Id.
8by amending the deﬁnition of “substantial evidence” in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) from
requiring evidence “from adequate and well controlled investigations” to permitting evidence of eﬀectiveness
to be established “with data from one adequate and well-controlled clinical investigation and conﬁrmatory
evidence (obtained prior to or after the investigation), if the FDA determines, based on relevant science,
that such data are suﬃcient.”37 These provisions give the agency considerable ﬂexibility in determining the
extent and manner of information necessary to support a license application.
Nonetheless, fast-track products are still expected to undergo rigorous and sound scientiﬁc review.38 The
standards applicable to clinical trials are set forth at 21 C.F.R. 314.126. This section deﬁnes the purpose
of clinical investigations as “distinguish[ing] the eﬀect of a drug from other inﬂuences, such as spontaneous
change in the course of the disease, placebo eﬀect, or biased observation.”39 To this end, the rule requires
“the study report should provide suﬃcient details of study design, conduct, and analysis to allow critical
evaluation and a determination of whether the characteristics of an adequate and well-controlled study
are present.”40 Part b of the rule lists characteristics of well-controlled studies; these include: a protocol
with clear objectives and a method of analysis that “permits a valid comparison with a control to provide a
quantitative assessment of drug eﬀect;” adequate measures taken to properly select patients, and assign them
to treatment or control groups; and steps taken to minimize bias at each stage, from patient enrollment to
data analysis. 41 Several methods of “control” are recognized, including comparison of the experimental drug
with known therapy – “active treatment control” – “where the condition treated is such that administration
of placebo or no treatment would be contrary to the interest of the patient.”42 In the case of active treatment
control, the rule notes that “the report of the study should assess the ability of the study to have detected a
37Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA Relinguish the “Gold Standard” for New Drug Approval? Redeﬁning “Substantial Evidence”
in the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 127, 136 and 146 (1999).
38Food & Drug Admin., The FDA Modernization Act of 1997, FDA Backgrounder (Nov. 21, 1997); Hearings, supra Note 18
at 12 (Statement of Rep. Diana Degette, Member, House Comm. On Energy and Commerce).
3921 C.F.R. 314.126(a). See also Kulynych, supra Note 37 at 129.
4021 C.F.R. 314.126.
4121 C.F.R. 314.126(b).
42Id.
9diﬀerence between treatments.”43 Studies for accelerated approval often utilize active treatment control by
looking at the experimental drug as a single-agent in patients having failed existing therapies.44
Pursuant to the Modernization Act, FDA has issued a guidance concerning the evidentiary requirements for
demonstrating the eﬀectiveness of drugs and biologics.45 The guidance points out that more than one clinical
trial is usually required because of “the need for independent substantiation of experimental results.”46 In
particular, multiple trials reduces the risk from systematic bias, random chance, site or investigator speciﬁc
factors, and the occasional fraud, “by providing consistency across more than one study.”47 Approval for a
new drug – as opposed to a new use for an already approved drug – based on a single study “will generally be
limited to situations in which a trial has demonstrated a clinically meaningful eﬀect on mortality, irreversible
morbidity, or prevention of a disease ...and conﬁrmation of the result in a second trial would be practically or
ethically impossible.”48 As mentioned earlier, however, since 1998 the FDA has considered cancer products
for approval based upon tumor shrinkage. The guidance notes that chances for approval are increased where
a study has certain characteristics. Large, multicenter studies carry greater weight where no site provides an
unusually large fraction of patients, and no investigator or site is disproportionately responsible for observed
results.49 Results are also more credible where: there is consistency across study subsets – such as age, gender,
race, prior therapy, and disease stage; the activity of the drug can be assessed alone and in combination,
especially where results can be compared to each other, and to a placebo; and where the drug is shown to
be eﬀective against multiple clinical or surrogate endpoints.50 Finally, the more statistically signiﬁcant the
results, the better.51 Regardless of whether approval is based upon one or many studies, “[t]o demonstrate
43Id.
44Hearings, supra Note 18 at 39 (Preliminary Committee Staﬀ Report).
45Food and Drug Administration, Providing Clinical Evidence of Eﬀectiveness, supra Note 26.
46Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
47Id. at 4-5.
48Id. at 13.
49Id.
50Id. at 13-14.
51Id. at 115.
10that a trial supporting an eﬀectiveness claim is adequate and well-controlled, extensive documentation of
trial planning, protocols, conduct, and data handling is usually submitted to the Agency.”52 The guidance
notes that access to primary data is important because “study reports do not always contain a complete, or
entirely accurate, representation of study plans, conduct and outcomes.”53
Typically, journal article peer reviewers only have access to a limited data set and analyses, do
not see the original protocol and amendments, may not know what happed to study subjects that
investigators determined to be non-evaluable, and thus may lack suﬃcient information to detect
critical omissions and problems.54
The Chemistry of Erbitux and its Biologics License Application
ImClone’s highly touted cancer drug, Erbitux, was created in the early 1980’s by Dr. John Mendelsohn,
who joined ImClone’s board after the company acquired rights to the drug.55 It is an epidermal growth
factor receptor (EGFR) antagonist,56 intended to prevent the binding of Epidermal Growth Factor (EGF)
to EGFR, and thereby prevent cell proliferation, and inhibit cell survival.57 In English, this means Erbitux
acts something like those little plastic child-proof devices for wall outlets that plug into an electrical socket,
52Id. at 16.
53Id. at 17.
55Report to House Committee on Energy and Commerce by Raymond B. Weiss, MD, FACP (hereinafter Report of Dr.
Weiss), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/06132002Hearing587/hearing.htm. Note that although
this testimony is part of the ImClone hearings, see supra Note 18, it is not part of the transcript as available on the House
committee’s website.
.
56There is already one EGFR monoclonal antibody, trastuzumab (Herceptin), on the market for the treatment of breast
cancer, and other biotechnology companies are pursuing similar products. Report of Dr. Weiss, supra Note 55.
57Press Release, ImClone Systems, Inc., ImClone Systems Incorporated Reports on Anti-Angiogenesis Data at Ameri-
can Association for Cancern Research Meeting (March 30, 1998), available at http://www.imclone.com/news; Ron Winslow
and Geeta Anand, Laboratory Mixup: A Novel Cancer Drug, A Big Biotech Deal, And Now a Bitter Feud, Wall St.
J., Feb. 7, 2002, at A1; Report of Dr. Weiss, supra Note 55. See also ImClone Systems, Inc., Erbitux, available at
http://www.imclone.com/imc-c225.html (as of April 20, 2003).
11but do not activate the socket as a normal plug would. Erbitux is the correct shape to interact with speciﬁc
receptors (sockets) on the surface of cancer cells, but does not activate the cell in any way. The importance is
not so much in what Erbitux does directly, but in what it prevents other proteins from doing. The receptors
Erbitux binds to (EGFR) are normally the target of other proteins (EGF) that signal a cell to grow and
divide. When Erbitux binds to these receptors, it prevents the other proteins from signaling the cell. Because
cancers become more dangerous, and harder to ﬁght, the more they spread, the idea is to ﬁght the cancer
by blocking the receptors, thereby reducing the speed of the cancer growth. The receptors Erbitux acts
to block are often, but not always found on cancer cells, and before treating patients with the drug it is
necessary to ﬁrst screen them to determine if their cancer cells are EGFR positive. These receptors are also
found on ordinary body cells, but there are two critical diﬀerences: (1) research demonstrates normal cells
are better at ﬁnding alternative signaling pathways to those blocked by Erbitux, allowing them to grow and
divide normally; and (2) while normal cells may have about 10,000 of these receptors, cancer cells can have
millions.58 It is known that where these receptors are overexpressed in cancer cells, the cancer tends to
proliferate and spread faster.59
ImClone ﬁled an IND for Erbitux in 1994.60 Since then, ImClone has tested Erbitux for safety and eﬃcacy
in preclinical and clinical trials for treatment of several types of cancer including head and neck cancer, renal
cancer, and colorectal cancer.61 In addition to the Phase II study which became the basis for the Erbitux
BLA in 2001, the company conducted, and continues to conduct, numerous Phase II trials, and several Phase
III trials.62
58Lemonick et al., supra Note 11; Catherine Arnst, supra Note 13; ImClone Systems, Inc., Erbitux, supra Note 57. The range
of EGFR expression varies among cancer types.
59Report of Dr. Weiss, supra Note 55.
60Hearings, supra Note 18 at 189 (Testimony of Patricia Keegan, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Food and
Drug Administration).
61ImClone Systems, Inc., Erbitux, supra Note 57.
62Id.; Press Release, ImClone Systems, Inc., ImClone Systems to Receive $5 Million Milestone Payment from Partner, Merck
KgaA, on ImClone Systems’ Lead Cancer Therapeutic, C225 (March 9, 1999), available at http://www.imclone.com/news;
Press Release, ImClone Systems, Inc., ImClone Systems to Initiate Second Phase III Pivotal Clinical Trial of C225 in Head and
Neck Carcinoma (May 11, 1999), available at http://www.imclone.com/news.
12The pivotal Phase II study relied on by ImClone in its BLA sought to determine the eﬃcacy of Erbitux in
combination with a standard chemotherapy drug, irinotecan, in refractory colorectal cancer patients.63 “The
whole scientiﬁc basis for clinical use of this new drug was that the combination of irinotecan and cetuximab
[Erbitux] represented a potentially eﬀective, third-line therapy for patients with metastatic [colorectal cancer]
after failing prior 5-FU and irinotecan therapy.”64 The company enlisted 139 patients, and measured the
reduction in the size of their tumors over time – a surrogate endpoint for patient survival.65 The trial,
number 9923, was not originally intended as a registration study, however preliminary results encouraged
ImClone’s management to approach FDA earlier than planned.66 At an August 2000 meeting – after the
study was underway, but before the results were fully analyzed – ImClone and FDA discussed the elements
of an Erbitux BLA, and agreed on what the 9923 trial would need to establish for a license to be granted: (1)
that patients had tumors that progressed despite prior treatment with irinotecan; (2) that at least 15 percent
of patients responded to the combined regimen of Erbitux and irinotecan, with at least a 50 percent reduction
in tumor size (known as a “partial response”); and (3) that the ﬁndings met statistical requirements.67 The
results of 9923 were initially announced to the 2001 annual meeting of the American Society of Clinical
Oncology, and in a coinciding press release on May 12, 2001. Of 120 evaluable patients, ImClone reported
that 27 patients (22.5%) had a partial response, with a median duration of response of 186 days.68
In the meantime, FDA granted Erbitux fast-track status on January 12, 2001.69 As a condition of fast-
63“Refractory” means the cancer progressd despite adequate prior treatment with the relevant drug, in this case irinotecan.
Irinotecan is a chemotherapy drug also known as Camptosar, and CPT-11.
64Report of Dr. Weiss, supra Note 55; Hearings, supra Note 18 at 40 (Preliminary Committee Staﬀ Report). Chemotherapy
drug 5-ﬂuorouracil (5-FU) was the only available drug for treatment of colorectal cancer between 1959 and 1996 when irninotecan
was approved.
65Report of Dr. Weiss, supra Note 55. Of these 139 patients, 121 had progressive cancer after initial irinotecan treatment,
but only 120 ended up in the ﬁnal results. No information is available on what happened to the 121st patient.
66Id.
67Ron Winslow and Geeta Anand, Laboratory Mixup: A Novel Cancer Drug, A Big Biotech Deal, And Now a Bitter Feud,
supra Note 15; Report of Dr. Weiss, supra Note 55.
68Press Release, ImClone Systems, Inc., ImClone Systems Announces Achievement of a 22.5 Percent Response Rate in its
Phase II Clinical Study of IMC-C225 and Chemotherpy in Patients with Refractory Colorectal Cancer (May 12, 2001), available
at http://www.imclone.com/news; Report of Dr. Weiss, supra Note 55.
69Hearings, supra Note 18 at 40 (Preliminary Committee Staﬀ Report); Press Release, ImClone Systems, Inc., ImClone
Systems Incorporated Receives fast track Designation for IMC-C225 From U.S. Food and Drug Administration (Feb. 1, 2001),
13track designation, however, FDA required ImClone to conduct a small study of Erbitux as a single agent
in colorectal cancer patients refractory for irinotecan.70 In a January 19, 2001 letter to ImClone, FDA
explained that the purpose of the single-agent study, along with other information requested, was to:
...exclude[ ] the possibility [at 95% conﬁdence interval] that the response rate observed with the
combination of irinotecan and Cetuximab [Erbitux] would not be observed with single agent Ce-
tuximb at the dose and schedule proposed. You must provide evidence that continuation of a toxic
agent (irinotecan) is necessary to achieve the desired clinical eﬀect.71
ImClone enrolled 57 patients in study number 0141, intended to measure the eﬃcacy of Erbitux as a single
agent in individuals who failed prior treatment with three-drug chemotherapy regime (ﬂuorouracil, leucov-
orin, and irinotecan). The trial was completed on October 12, 2001, and at the end of that month ImClone
reported to FDA that six patients (10.5%) showed partial response.72 The report of study 0141 marked the
completion of the Erbitux BLA.73
The RTF Letter and the Problems with ImClone’s Science
It did not take FDA reviewers long to ﬁnd problems with the Erbitux application, but one of the most trou-
bling aspects of the ImClone case is the extent of the problems the agency uncovered, especially pertaining to
the company’s pivotal 9923 study. Despite monitoring by a contract research organization (PharmaNet),74
available at http://www.imclone.com/news.
70Hearings, supra Note 18 at 40 (Preliminary Committee Staﬀ Report, citing Jan. 19, 2001 letter from FDA to ImClone).
72Id. at 41 (Preliminary Committee Staﬀ Report, quoting Jan. 19, 2001 letter from FDA to ImClone).
73Ron Winslow and Geeta Anand, Laboratory Mixup: A Novel Cancer Drug, A Big Biotech Deal, And Now a Bitter Feud,
supra Note 15.
74Report of Dr. Weiss, supra Note 55.
14FDA discovered numerous inconsistencies in the implementation of the study protocol, and a basic failure
to provide adequate documentation to support the reported results. As discussed above, in the fast-track
and accelerated approval processes the standard rules of drug approval are bent in an eﬀort to get life-saving
products to market.75 Nonetheless, it is still necessary to demonstrate that the experimental drug is the
cause of any observed results, and that all results are statistically signiﬁcant.76 In it’s RTF letter FDA
concluded ImClone had failed on both counts.
ImClone’s diﬃculties in demonstrating the eﬀectiveness of Erbitux were created in part by its attempt to
get the drug approved for use in conjunction with irinotecan. At the time, no drug had ever been approved
through fast track based solely upon data in combination studies.77 Harlan Waksal – who co-founded Im-
Clone with his brother Sam and is the current CEO – testiﬁed that, based upon preclinical trials, ImClone
concluded that Erbitux was ineﬀective as a treatment by itself, and therefore did not seek approval for
the drug acting alone.78 But analysis of the single-agent study revealed that although only 10.5 percent of
patients responded – compared to a reported 22.5 percent in the combination study – the results from the
two trials were not statistically distinguishable.79 They failed, in other words, to meet the requirement set
out in FDA’s letter of January 19, 2001. Dr. Richard Pazdur of the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research (CDER) – which reviews licensing applications for conventional pharmaceutical drugs – noted
that given the small size of the two studies “you had to have a zero percent [response] almost in the single
75Hearings, supra Note 18 at 39 (Preliminary Committee Staﬀ Report).
76Id. at 238.
77Ron Winslow and Geeta Anand, Laboratory Mixup: A Novel Cancer Drug, A Big Biotech Deal, And Now a Bitter Feud,
supra Note 15; Hearings, supra Note 18 at 39 (Preliminary Committee Staﬀ Report, quoting BMS Due Dilligence Findings of
June 12, 2001). To my knowledge none have since.
78Hearings, supra Note 18 at 77 (Testimony of Harlan Waksal, CEO, ImClone Systems, Inc.).
79The Cancer Letter, FDA Says ImClone Data Insuﬃcient to Evaluate Colorectal Cancer Drug C225, vol. 28, no. 1
(Jan. 4, 2002) (reporting the 95% conﬁdence intervals for the combination and single-agent studies at 15.4%, 30.5%, and 4%,
21.5% respectively). See also Gardiner Harris, ImClone Shares Fall Amid FDA Concerns, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 2002, at B14;
Hearings, supra Note 18 at 209 (Testimony of Dr. Richard Pazdur, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug
Administration); Press Release, ImClone Systems, Inc., Data Presented on Study of ERBITUXTM (cetuximab) Combined with
Docetaxel in Patients with Advanced Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer (May 19, 2002), available at http://www.imclone.com/news.
15agent Erbitux study” to achieve a statistical diﬀerence in comparison with the 9923 study.80 While the
single-agent study supported ImClone’s contention that Erbitux is aﬀective in ﬁghting colorectal cancer, it
undermined the company’s application for use in combination.
While comparing results from the two studies suggests Erbitux may work as well on its own as in com-
bination, many of the problems the FDA found with the 9923 study raised more fundamental questions
about whether Erbitux works at all. The agency noted several apparent violations of the study’s eligibility
requirements, and especially the requirement that patients be refractory to irinotecan, making it diﬃcult to
determine which drug, Erbitux or irinotecan, caused the observed results. Dr. Pai-Scherf, the medical review
oﬃcer for the Erbitux BLA, testiﬁed that he noticed early on in his review that key evidence documenting
the refractory nature of patients was missing.81 The doctor stated that necessary CAT scans were missing
for at least 11 patients, and that the “clinical judgment” of researchers that these patients were refractory
was not adequate to support licensure.82 In addition to patients admitted even though they may not have
been truly refractory, numerous patients were admitted that failed more basic criteria such as blood tests.
Representatives for ImClone explained that exemptions from the enrollment criteria were issued in some
cases where it was determined such exemptions would not aﬀect the study results. Harlan Waksal acknowl-
edged that ImClone failed in several instances to provide adequate documentation of patient eligibility, but
he maintained that the major protocol deviation was admitting patients with abnormal liver tests where the
doctor in charge determined there was no additional risk to the patient83 However, independent oncology
consultant, Dr. Raymond Weiss, testiﬁed that “[e]ligibility exemptions are forbidden in all clinical trials
with which I have experience.”84 Weiss acknowledged that eligibility errors do occur “5, 6, 8 percent of the
80Hearings, supra Note 18 at 209 (Testimony of Dr. Richard Pazdur, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and
Drug Administration).
81Id. at 210 (Testimony of Dr. Lee Pai-Scherf, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration).
82Id.
83Id. at 72, 81 (Testimony of Harlan Waksal, CEO, ImClone Systems, Inc.).
84Report of Dr. Weiss, supra Note 55.
16time,” but pointed out that the BMS review of the 9923 study, conducted in January 2002 concluded that 37
patients (30.8%) failed to meet at least one requirement of eligibility, and eight patients failed more than one
requirement.85 Fifteen of these 37 patients were given exemptions to enter the study, meaning researchers
were aware of the patients’ inelligibility, but admitted them to the study anyway.86 Dr. Weiss insisted that
“[w]ithout carefully deﬁning what category of patient is eligible for entry on such a study, any results from
the trial will be subject to various biases and likely be meaningless.”87
Compounding the problem of patient ineligibility were inconsistencies in the dose and administration fre-
quency of irinotecan during the trial. As with patient enrollment criteria, the exact method of administering
drugs during a trial “must be deﬁned and adhered to” in order to prevent bias in the results.88 While the
9923 protocol required patients receive irinotecan in the same amount and frequency as prior to the study,
BMS found at least 17 patients with major changes in irinotecan treatment after entering the study, includ-
ing some dose increases.89 Harlan Waksal maintained that the protocol “set out very clearly what should
take place with Irinotecan treatment” in various circumstances, and that of the few cases where irinotecan
dosage was increased, only one of the patients responded.”90 But Dr. Weiss disagreed, contending that
the protocol failed to provide instructions for modifying irinotecan dose or frequency in case of toxicity in a
patient; “treating physician’s would thus make ad hoc decisions regarding this point, with multiple variations
based on the physician’s best judgment.”91 He argued that “[y]ou couldn’t separate the eﬀect of increasing
the dose of the one drug from the eﬀect of the combination of the two drugs, either the Erbitux and/or the
Irinotecan. When you are giving more of one drug than you had before, you are changing the results, and,
85Hearings, supra Note 18 at 24 (Testimony of Dr. Raymond Weiss, Consultant in Oncology); Report of Dr. Weiss, supra
Note 55.
86Report of Dr. Weiss, supra Note 55.
87Id.
88Id.
89Id.
90Hearings, supra Note 18 at 71 (Testimony of Harlan Waksal, CEO, ImClone Systems, Inc.).
91Report of Dr. Weiss, supra Note 55.
17again, you make the results of the study subject to question.”92
Considering all the problems the FDA eventually expressed with Erbitux application, it is worth recalling that
ImClone sought accelerated approval based upon a single study that already was complete. The 9923 study
combined several features that were problematic, though not necessarily fatal, to its use as a registration
study: (1) it was a combination study of Erbitux and irinotecan; (2) it studied tumor shrinkage as a surrogate
for patient survival; and (3) only 120 patients were evaluated. Dr. Pazdur explained in his Congressional
testimony that in seeking approval from CDER companies can request prior FDA approval of a study
protocol, which is made binding on the agency through a Special Protocol Assessment.93 CBER, however,
has never used a Special Protocol Assessment for a biologic.94 Ostensibly in an eﬀort to explain why so many
protocol violations occurred during the 9923 study, Harlan Waksal testiﬁed at the Congressional hearings
that “the most important issue with this trial is that it was never initiated as a registration study, it was
a Phase II study.”95 But this simply begs the question: why was ImClone granted fast-track status in the
ﬁrst place?
Part III: FDA Monitoring
The problems in the 9923 study protocol, and the data ImClone collected – or failed to collect – tell only one
side of the story. On the other side are questions about why it took the FDA so long to confront the trial’s
inadequacies, and why the agency allowed the positive publicity surrounding Erbitux to continue unchecked,
92Hearings, supra Note 18 at 24 (Testimony of Dr. Raymond Weiss, Consultant in Oncology).
93Hearings, supra Note 18 at 39 footnote 1, 201 (Preliminary Committee Staﬀ Report).
94Id.
95Hearings, supra Note 18 at 82 (Testimony of Harlan Waksal, CEO, ImClone Systems, Inc.).
18even after it became aware of these problems. W.J. “Billy” Tauzin, the chairman of the House committee
investigating the ImClone aﬀair stated the problem this way:
[T]he leadership of [Imclone] had total control over what information would be released to the public,
about its own studies and about the quality of this new product and about its potential since under
our rules FDA is prohibited and restricted under Federal law from talking about such proprietary
information. So we have a process whereby FDA is being restricted on what it can say about the
clinical studies and about what is happening with this drug, while the company can go out and
hype it and take advantage of it ﬁnancially, while at the same time, according to our investigation,
recognizing all the while that its studies were ﬂawed and there were problems with the FDA approval
process.96
These sentiments were echoed by other members of the committee who expressed concern that much of the
damage created by the investor reaction to the Erbitux RTF letter could have been avoided if problems were
identiﬁed earlier, and important information was relayed to the public where necessary.
Early Warning Signs
Though the FDA remained in contact with ImClone as the company worked to complete the its BLA, the
agency was not actively reviewing information as it was submitted by the company. But there were two
points at which it is arguable the FDA should have taken steps to ensure accurate information reached the
public. The ﬁrst was in August of 2000, when the agency ﬁrst reviewed the 9923 protocol. The second was
in November and early December, 2001, when the agency was reviewing the Erbitux application.
19Problems with the Protocol
Evidence presented at the Congressional hearings made clear that the FDA had concerns about the 9923
trial as early as August 2000, when it ﬁrst met with ImClone oﬃcials to discuss Erbitux licensing. In
a pre-meeting to its scheduled August 2000 conference with ImClone, the primary FDA medical review
oﬃcer expressed reservations about the 9923 study. Speciﬁcally, she was concerned that the proposed overall
response rate target of 15 percent was not meaningful in a combination study, and that the study did not
meet accelerated approval criteria and fast track criteria.97 Further problems were pointed out during the
congressional hearings by witnesses who reviewed the protocol after the fact. Dr. Weiss testiﬁed that the
FDA should have told ImClone that speciﬁcations for giving Irinotecan were inadequate; an oversight that
certainly contributed to the numerous inconsistencies noted in the RTF letter.98 Dr. Pazdur added that
the Erbitux development plan relied too heavily on preclinical activity in animal models.99 “[T]o conduct a
whole development plan and a sole development plan on an animal model is a very risky venture.”100
Nevertheless, the medical review oﬃcer was overruled by the head of CBER, Dr. Patricia Keegan, whose
decision was based “on her belief that she should be ﬂexible for a promising drug meeting an unmet medical
need, but was also based on representations that ImClone made about the special synergistic eﬀect of Erbitux
when used in combination with irinotecan.”101 Dr. Keegan testiﬁed that “there were issues with the protocol
that were problematic, but presented with the results of the study, we didn’t consider it [sic] to be a fatal
ﬂaw, but a protocol that didn’t answer every question necessary to review the drug for approval.”102 The
FDA sought to answer some of these questions by requiring ImClone to conduct the 0141 single-agent study,
97Id. at 39, 197-198.
98Id. at 30.
99Id. at 192 (Testimony of Dr. Richard Pazdur, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration).
100Id.
101Id.. at 40, 198.
102Id.. at 208 (Testimony of Dr. Patricia Keegan, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administra-
tion).
20but Dr. Keegan’s testimony does not explain why so many concerns remained undiscovered, or at least
unaddressed, by the time the BLA was completed.
Ironically, despite all the problems the FDA found with the 9923 study, it failed to realize until after issuing
the RTF letter that in reviewing the study it was relying on the wrong version of the study protocol. The
FDA’s minutes of the August 2000 meeting with ImClone – which were sent to the company for review -
describe the 9923 protocol (Version 1.0) as requiring that enrolled patients “demonstrated progression of
disease after completing a minimum of two courses of a regimen containing irinotecan.”103 The same version
of the protocol was described in the letter from the agency to ImClone pursuant to the grant of fast-track
designation in January of 2001.104 However, the protocol actually used in the study (Version 2.0) required
only that a patient “has documented stable disease (must have received a minimum of 12 weeks of irinotecan
therapy) or progressive disease at any time after receiving an irinotecan-containing regimen.105 The second
version of the protocol eﬀectively loosened the patient eligibility requirements because no minimum amount
or duration of irinotecan therapy was required.106
At the Congressional hearing, ImClone oﬃcials defended the 9923 protocol, arguing that the problems with
the study arose from improper execution, and failure to collect the necessary documentation, not from
ﬂaws in the study design.107 Dr. Harlan Waksal testiﬁed that the protocol changes from Version 1.0 to
2.0 were “minor,” and that FDA was presented with the amended protocol “well before August 2000.”108
The eligibility criteria were altered, he explained, because the “[m]edical practice doesn’t allow doctors to
103Id. at 39-40 (Preliminary Committee Staﬀ Report, internal quotes omitted), 89-90.
104Id. at 40 (Preliminary Committee Staﬀ Report).
105Id. (internal quotes omitted, emphasis supplied in Staﬀ Report).
106Report of Dr. Weiss, supra Note 55.
107Hearings, supra Note 18 at 278 (Testimony of Harlan Waksal, CEO, ImClone Systems, Inc.).
108Id. at 70-71 (Testimony of Harlan Waksal, CEO, ImClone Systems, Inc.).
21continue patients on a drug if they have new lesions or progression. So the doctors, in conjunction with
the company, made a modiﬁcation to the protocol to allow patients who where failing the drug to be on
the protocol.”109 Though this may help explain variations in the time to refractory status of some patients,
it raises the equally troubling question of whether continuing patients on irinotecan, even in combination
with Erbitux, was ethical. At the hearing Dr. Pazdur stated that continuing treatment, with a toxic drug
such as irinotecan, after patients failed initial therapy “violates every principle that I know of in medical
oncology.”110 By contrast, ImClone oﬃcials conveyed to FDA their belief that it would be unethical to
study Erbitux as a single agent when preclinical data suggested it would be ineﬀectual.111 Regardless of
where the truth lies between the testimony of the FDA and ImClone oﬃcials, it is clear that a serious
miscommunication occurred with respect to the version of the study protocol actually being used. More
disturbing still is the prospect that a drug could be approved without FDA ever realizing it relied on the
wrong protocol.
Deﬁciencies in the Data
Despite early questions about the protocol, Dr. Keegan pointed out that, at the time of the August 2000
meeting, FDA was still relying on the company’s representation of the 9923 study results, and it was not
until October 2001, when it received the clinical data for studies 9923 and 0141, that the agency realized
ﬂaws in the conduct of the study made the results problematic.112 Assuming, for the sake of argument, that
the protocol was not fatally ﬂawed, this still does not explain the agency’s silence in those ﬁnal two months
109Id. at 77.
110Id. at 192 (Testimony of Dr. Richard Pazdur, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration).
111Id. at 199, 209.
112Id. at 207-208 (Testimony of Dr. Patricia Keegan, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Admin-
istration), 41 (Preliminary Committee Staﬀ Report).
22when damage might have been mitigated.
As noted earlier, FDA reviewers realized soon after consideration of the completed BLA began in November,
2001, that the clinical research was “severely deﬁcient and could not meet the legal requirement of an
adequate and well-controlled clinical trial.”113 But while the agency was aware that ImClone had announced
the results of the study, and that those results were receiving considerable media attention, it did not suggest
that the company retract, or qualify its earlier statements about the study. By November 30, the reviewers
had decided to recommend that the agency refuse the Erbitux application, but this was not mentioned to
the company during its December 4 meeting with the agency, nor was it suggested that the company make
clear to investors that an RTF letter remained a possibility. Both Dr. Lilly Lee, who represented ImClone
during the meeting, and George Mills of CBER, testiﬁed that the possibility of an RTF letter was discussed
as one of several possible outcomes of the agency’s BLA review, but that Dr. Mills gave no indication that
an RTF letter was not only likely, but almost inevitable.114 Dr. Mills explained that he was only “halfway
through the ﬁling assessment,” and since the ﬁnal decision had not been made he felt it was inappropriate to
discuss internal agency communications with the company.115 Even accepting that Dr. Mills’ caution was
warranted, the FDA might still have informed the company when it came to a ﬁnal decision to issue an RTF
letter the very next day. Instead, the company was not notiﬁed of the decision until December 28, more
than three weeks later. This created ample time for the information to leak, facilitating insider trading.116
113Id. at 41-42 (Preliminary Committee Staﬀ Report).
114Id. at 42 (Preliminary Committee Staﬀ Report), 68 (Testimony of Dr. Lilly Lee, Vice President, Regulatory Aﬀairs,
ImClone Systems, Inc.), 203-204 (Testimony of Dr. George Mills, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug
Administration).
115Id. at 204, 206 (Testimony of Dr. George Mills, Center fr Biologics Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administra-
tion).
116Id. at 42 (Preliminary Committee Staﬀ Report).
23FDA’s Authority to Monitor and Disclose Information
There are three avenues by which information available to the FDA might theoretically reach investors. The
most direct route is for the FDA to simply issue a press release providing any information necessary to protect
the public. Alternatively, members of the public could seek to obtain information from the agency in order
to better evaluate a drug’s prospects. Finally, as discussed in Part IV, the FDA could share information
with the SEC to help that agency take action to ensure a company’s public disclosures are complete and
accurate. In each case, however, the FDA is severely limited in its ability to disclose pertinent information.
Section 301(b) of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 242o gives FDA the authority to issue information
“related to public health, in the form of publications or otherwise, for the use of the public ....” Nonetheless,
FDA could not simply issue a press release to provide the world with evidence of the ﬂaws in the Erbitux
application. The FDA’s own regulations largely prevent it from voluntarily disclosing to the public infor-
mation contained in a BLA, except where the drug’s sponsor consents. Regulation 21 CFR 601.51 states
that, even when the existence of a BLA is public knowledge, “no data or information contained in the ﬁle is
available for public disclosure before such license is issued.”117 This includes data from “all studies and tests
of a biological product on animals and humans and all studies and tests on the drug for identity, stability,
purity, potency, and bioavailability.”118 The regulation does permit the agency to disclose “a summary of
such selected portions of the safety and eﬀectiveness data as are appropriate for public consideration of a
speciﬁc pending issue, e.g., at an open session of a Food and Drug Administration advisory committee ...,”
but this narrow exception would not likely encompass a purely prophylactic disclosure of the kind needed
11721 C.F.R. 601.51
11821 C.F.R. 601.51(g).
24to alleviate public misperceptions about the strength of a pending BLA.119 Consequently, even if agency
oﬃcials had thought to do so, their ability to warn the public directly of the problems with the Erbitux BLA
was extremely limited.
Nor could the problem be resolved if investors or public interest groups simply requested information from
the agency about pending BLAs. Although the D.C. Circuit has determined that 21 CFR 601.51 does not
itself prevent the FDA from responding to a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.
552, 120 the FOIA generally allows administrative agencies to refuse to disclose such information under an
exception pertaining to “trade secrets and commercial or ﬁnancial information obtained from a person and
privileged or conﬁdential.”121 For purposes of public disclosure, the FDA deﬁnes “trade secret” and “conﬁ-
dential commercial information” at 21 CFR 20.61. This regulation adopts the distinction between these two
terms drawn by the D.C. Circuit in Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA (1983),122 which rejected
the broader Restatement of Torts deﬁnition of “trade secret,” previously adopted by the FDA, in favor of a
narrower meaning:
A trade secret may consist of any commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used
for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can be said
to be the end product of either innovation or substantial eﬀort. There must be a direct relationship
between the trade secret and the productive process.123
By contrast, conﬁdential commercial information “means valuable data or information which is used in one’s
business and is of a type customarily held in strict conﬁdence or regarded as privileged and not disclosed
to any member of the public by the person to whom it belongs.”124 In Public Citizen Health Research
11921 C.F.R. 601.51(d)(1).
120Campaign for Responsible Transplantation v. FDA, 219 F. Supp. 2d 106, 115, fn. 10 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2002).
12180 Stat. 250 (1966)
122704 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. April 15, 1983). An unrelated case by the same name is cited later, and in order to distinguish
the cases the year of the respective decisions will be included when the cases are cited by name.
12421 C.F.R. 20.61(b) (1994).
25Group (1983), the D.C. Circuit determined that information “instrumental in gaining marketing approval”
is clearly commercial for purposes of the FOIA exception.125 However, courts have had a more diﬃcult
time determining if such information is conﬁdential. In order to be conﬁdential, disclosure of requested
information must be likely to either: (1) impair the Government’s ability to obtain necessary information in
the future; or (2) cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the party from whom the information
was obtained.126 The ﬁrst clause is generally inapplicable where the information must be submitted to the
agency, as is the case for clinical trial information when seeking a BLA.127 Applying the second clause, results
vary depending on the circumstances. In general the D.C. Circuit has recognized the potential competitive
harm that could result from disclosure of information in a license application:
Thus, a drug manufacturer which has submitted an NDA has a competitive interest in seeing that
the information contained in its NDA is not prematurely released to the public. If a manufacturer’s
competitor could obtain all the data in the manufacturer’s NDA, it could utilize them in its own NDA
without incurring the time, labor, risk, and expense involved in developing them independently.128
The court has recognized exceptions to this rule, but never where the information pertained to recent clinical
trials used to support a pending license application.129 There is little doubt, therefore, that the clinical trial
data in the Erbitux BLA constituted conﬁdential commercial information that could not be disclosed under
the FOIA.
Despite these constraints, FDA does have some authority to address perceived misbehavior by drug sponsors.
The agency has the authority, under 21 U.S.C. 336, to issue written notice to companies notifying them of
125Public Citizen Health Research Group, 704 F.2d at 1290.
126Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 185 F.3d 898, 903 (Aug. 6, 1999) (no relationship to the 1983 case of the
same name).
127Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d at 1291.
129See Teich v. FDA, 751 F.Supp. 243 (D.C.Cir. Nov. 27, 1990) (Exception (b)(4) of the FOIA not applicable to release of
“ﬁnal results” and protocol information for animal tests where several factors, including the age of the tests, weighed against
any commercial harm to the company).
26agency concerns, and instructing them to cease any oﬀending activity.130 If the company persists, FDA
may take further action, including suspending review of a drug application.131 Informal warnings do have
their limits, however. FDA still has no authority to regulate statements made prior to the relevant product
coming under review by the agency.132 CBER Director Keegan testiﬁed that enforcement is also constrained
by limits in resources and staﬀ.133 And of course before FDA can take action it must become aware of a
violation. Dr. Keegan pointed out that “we are often hampered in the pre-marketing setting by ...not
having the facts and the raw data, and not being able to tell how far oﬀ the mark they are...”134 This was
largely the case with respect to Erbitux prior to the agency initiating review of the application. Perhaps
FDA should have recognized the inadequacy of the trial protocol in August 2000, but since it did not, it had
no reason to take action against the company. The agency had no cause, at that time, to doubt the veracity
or good faith of ImClone’s contentions about Erbitux eﬃcacy. Nor were the company’s public disclosures
such that the agency should have been concerned. As discussed in greater detail in Part IV, during the
period before October 31, 2001, statements by ImClone concerning the results of the 9923 trial, and results
from other trials, were typical of a biotechnology company, and in keeping with the information available to
the agency. Consequently, there was probably not suﬃcient evidence of wrongdoing for FDA to take action
prior to commencing review of the BLA.
Once the review began, however, and the problems with the data became readily apparent, the FDA arguably
130Untitled letters and Warning letters are available under the Freedom of Information Act, and some are available on the
FDA website, but no public announcement is made when they are issued. Examples of past FDA enforcement actions were
supplied for the record at the hearing, however they provide limited insight into the ImClone situation because they all deal
with eﬀorts to revoke approval based upon false or misleading information provided to the agency, not to the public. Hearings,
supra Note 18 at 243, 245 (Testimony of Dr. Lester Crawford, Deputy Director, Food and Drug Administration).
131Hearings, supra Note 18 at 231-232 (Testimony of Dr. Lester Crawford, Deputy Director, Food and Drug Administration).
132Id. at 247 (Testimony of Dr. Lester Crawford, Deputy Director, Food and Drug Administration).
133Id. at 194 (Testimony of Dr. Patricia Keegan, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administra-
tion).
134Id. at 202 (Testimony of Dr. Patricia Keegan, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administra-
tion).
27had adequate cause to take some corrective measures. FDA oﬃcials certainly could have communicated their
concerns to ImClone management, perhaps at the December 4 meeting, and recommended the company
withdraw the application or otherwise caution investors of the agency’s concerns. While acknowledging that
the Center has the authority to do so, Dr. Keegan testiﬁed that CBER was not in the habit of notifying
a company of an upcoming RTF letter, and that in her opinion such notiﬁcation “might to some extent
be considered coercive,” though she did not explain why.135 By contrast, Dr. Pazdur noted that CDER
does sometimes choose to notify a company if an RTF letter is inevitable, and give the company the chance
to withdraw.136 But even if this information was conveyed to the company, there’s no guarantee it would
have done much to prevent insider trading and shareholder loses. As an alternative, when the agency ﬁrst
became aware of the problems with the 9923 study in November, the FDA could have chosen to issue a press
release stating simply that its preliminary assessment of the Erbitux application raised concerns about the
results previously disseminated by ImClone. Such a release need not provide any conﬁdential information,
and because the existence of the Erbitux BLA was well publicized by the company the announcement would
not run afoul of any disclosure rules. The agency recently adopted this tactic when, on March 14, 2003,
it issued a public warning about misrepresentations in a press release by SuperGen, Inc. concerning that
company’s cancer drug, Mitozytrex.137 The announcements points to several inaccuracies, including that
the company “exaggerates the eﬃcacy of Mitozytrex and fails to include the signiﬁcant risks associated with
the use of the drug.” The agency notes that SuperGen made statements suggesting its drug was superior to
existing drugs, and warned that “[n]o data submitted by the company provided evidence that Mitozytrex is
superior to existing marketed formulations of [competing drug].” A similar warning could have been issued
in November 2001 to alert the public about the risks of relying on ImClone’s analysis of the 9923 trial. The
135Id. at 207 (Testimony of Dr. Patricia Keegan, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administra-
tion).
136Id. at 206 (Testimony of Dr. Richard Pazdur, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration).
137Food and Drug Administration, FDA Warns Public About Misrepresentations in Marketing Claims About Drug to Treat
Cancer, FDA Talk Paper (March 14, 2003).
28issuance of a preliminary opinion is not without risks. Announcements of this sort could cause a company’s
stock price to ﬂuctuate wildly if used too often, and not phrased carefully. Nonetheless, the considerable
problems found in the Erbitux BLA, combined with the equally considerable hype in the media, suggest this
was a situation in which such a letter might have been warranted.
Part IV: SEC Disclosure Rules
Although FDA did not take any direct enforcement action, many of the concerns conveyed to ImClone in the
RTF were expressed in various prior communications with the company; unfortunately, they never reached
the public.138 Because the valuation of biotechnology companies is largely based upon speculation about the
success of products not yet on the market, investors necessarily rely heavily on information provided by the
company. Unfortunately, even to the extent FDA may be able to regulate disclosures once an application
for marketing approval is ﬁled – which we’ve seen is very limited – the agency has no authority to police
disclosures up to that point. FDA may, however, choose to share its concerns with the SEC.
In this context, the distinction between “trade secret” and “conﬁdential commercial information,” discussed
in the previous section, is especially important. Under agency regulations, the FDA may disclose non-public
information to other government agencies, while still maintaining the non-public nature of the information,
if certain conditions are met.139 While the regulations, in conjunction with section 331(j) of the FDCA,
138Chris Adams, ImClone, Bristol-Myers Mull Altering Pact, Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 2002, at A12; Report of Dr. Weiss, supra
Note 55.
13921 C.F.R. 20.80, 21 C.F.R. 20.85.
29prohibit the agency from sharing trade secret information outside the Department, no such restriction limits
the agency’s ability to share conﬁdential commercial information.140 We’ve already seen that in the context
of the FOIA, courts have characterized clinical trial protocols and data as commercial information, rather
than trade secret information, suggesting FDA could have supplied SEC with concrete evidence concerning
the problems with ImClone’s 9923 trial.141 But even if FDA chose not to disclose speciﬁcs, it could easily have
expressed general concerns about ImClone’s disclosures, and recommended an investigation. Dr. Crawford
testiﬁed before Congress that according to FDA’s Oﬃce of Chief Counsel, FDA and SEC are in daily
communication, suggesting FDA could pass along information about possible false or misleading statements
and rely on SEC for enforcement.142
Nonetheless, it may be that SEC’s ability to police information like that contained in the ImClone press
releases suﬀers from more fundamental problems. First, there is some concern that, even where SEC is
made aware of possible problems, it may lack the resources, to say nothing of the scientiﬁc expertise, needed
to evaluate the accuracy of many statements made by biotech companies; particularly pertaining to the
importance of trial results. The biggest hurdle, however, may be that many of the statements made by
ImClone simply did not constitute violations of the securities laws.
Questions of Integrity
14021 C.F.R. 20.85, 21 U.S.C. 331(j).
141It must be noted that prior to the D.C. Circuit’s 1983 decision in Public Citizen Health Research Group, the FDA applied
a much broader deﬁnition of “trade secret” that encompassed clinical trial information, and in that case the court explicitly
stated that the deﬁnition it adopted only applied in the context of Exemption 4 of the FOIA (704 F.2d 1280, 1290 footnote
27). It is possible, therefore, that FDA could argue that 331(j) prohibits disclosure of clinical trial information under a broader
deﬁnition of “trade secret;” however because the agency’s deﬁnitions of “trade secret” and “commercial information” are found
in the same Part of its regulations as the rules permitting disclosure to other agencies, this seems unlikely.
142Hearings, supra Note 18 at 231 (Testimony of Dr. Lester Crawford, Deputy Director, Food and Drug Administration).
30The integrity of ImClone’s disclosures, and more speciﬁcally those of its co-founder Sam Waksal, were
increasingly questioned and scrutinized in the wake of the Erbitux rejection. Just days after receipt of the
RTF letter, Sam Waksal sought to reassure investors that the issues in the RTF “all come out of the fact
that we have great data and great results but we did not document properly to their satisfaction the train of
thought that got us from point A to Z.”143 Despite evidence to the contrary, Waksal stated that independent
reviews of the study results showed that “there is concordance across the board.”144 He claimed that “the
crux of the FDA’s refusal is that the company failed to provide documentation of the ‘refractory’ nature of
patients enrolled in the pivotal-stage trial used to support the marketing application.”145 On January 4,
however, The Cancer Letter reported that it had acquired a copy of the normally secret RTF letter, and that
the letter “detailed a long list of concerns that the FDA had over Erbitux’s application that go far beyond
record-keeping errors” including failure to provide suﬃcient evidence of Erbitux activity.146 The RTF also
allegedly indicated that FDA had problems with the protocol for trial 9923 from the beginning, contrary to
statements made by Waksal.147 More questions were raised by the Congressional hearings where evidence
was presented that ImClone and BMS sought to make disclosures following the RTF intentionally vague.148
While these problems concern statements made after the Erbitux rejection, they do not bode well for the
integrity of statements made earlier. The possibility that disclosures by ImClone may have violated SEC
rules, and led to investor loss is troubling. Perhaps more troubling, however, is the extent to which much
of what ImClone announced to the public would not qualify as false or misleading under current law. The
primary diﬃculty seems to be that the SEC disclosure rules were not written with the biotechnology or
pharmaceutical communities in mind. Over the course of several years, ImClone released information on a
143Rachel Zimmerman, Cancer Treatment By ImClone, Bristol Hits FDA Hurdle, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 2002, at A8.
144Report of Dr. Weiss, supra Note 55. (quoting Sam Waksal, internal quotations omitted, emphasis supplied in testimony).
145ImClone May Need New Erbitux Trials, Delaying Its Launch, Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 2002, at B6.
146The Cancer Letter, vol. 28, no. 1, pg. 1-5. See also Gardiner Harris, ImClone Shares Fall Amid FDA Concerns, Wall St.
J., Jan. 8, 2002, at B14. It’s worth noting that whoever provided The Cancer Letter with a copy of the RTF violated federal
law.
147Rachel Zimmerman, Cancer Treatment By ImClone, Bristol Hits FDA Hurdle, supra Note 143.
148Geeta Anand and Gardiner Harris, ImClone, Bristol Had Discussed Vague Disclosures, Wall St. J., June 14, 2002, at A3.
31regular basis concerning the results and ongoing progress of its preclinical and clinical Erbitux trials. Often,
this information included data involving the number of patients responding to treatment, and the extent
of their response. Missing from these releases, however, are at least two important pieces of information.
First, study protocols are not released, except in the most basic form, making it impossible for investors to
determine the adequacy of controls in these studies. Second, no information about the statistical signiﬁcance
of study data is released, making it impossible to evaluate the scientiﬁc validity of the results. Compounding
this problem is the frequent use of words such as “signiﬁcant” to describe study results, but without any
attempt to deﬁne what is “signiﬁcant.”149 ImClone is certainly not alone in these respects, which merely
compounds the problem. Unable to evaluate the scientiﬁc merits of information provided by a company
investigating a new drug, investors are ﬂying blind.
Scope of SEC Authority
False or misleading statements or omissions of material fact are actionable under SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
240.10b-5, promulgated pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b).150
Statements must be “false” at the time they were made, and more speciﬁcally, must have “no good faith,
reasonable, objective basis.”151 In addition to disclosures mandated by law, “voluntary disclosure of infor-
mation that a reasonable investor would consider material must be complete and accurate.”152 Omissions
are only actionable if there was a duty to disclose the omitted information, usually because the information
149See Press Release, ImClone Systems, Inc., ImClone Systems’ Lead Cancer Therapeutic, C225, Demonstrates Anti-Tumor
Activity in Preclinical Models of Pancreatic Carcinoma (April 14, 1999), ImClone Systems and Collaborators Present Preclinical
Data on Mechanism and Anti-Tumor Activity of Lead Cancer Therapeutic, IMC-C225, in Combination with Radiation (Aprial
4, 2000), ImClone Systems Presents Preclinical Data on Anti-Tumor Activity of IMC-C225 in Combination with Chemotherapy
in Colorectal Carcinoma (March 26, 2001) available at http://www.imclone.com/news.
150In re Biogen Sec. Litig., 179 F.R.D. 25 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 1997) at 36 citing Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., 82 F.3d
1194, 1217 (1st Cir. 1996); In re Synergen, Inc. Sec. Litig., 863 F. Supp. 1409, 1410 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 1994).
151Fisher, 8 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 115 at 118
152Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1990) (internal quotes omitted).
32was necessary to make other mandatory or voluntary disclosures not misleading.153 Omissions are material
if there is “a substantial likelihood the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the rea-
sonable investor as having signiﬁcantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information available.”154 It is not enough
to demonstrate the company might not have believed what it said, rather the plaintiﬀ must demonstrate
that the company could not have believed what it said, and was therefore either knowing or reckless.155 It
is important to note that “[I]n the context of a Section 10(b) action ...[courts] must consider all of the
allegations of the complaint in the aggregate,” rather than looking at isolated statements or omissions.156
During the months and years prior to the Erbitux rejection, ImClone repeatedly disclosed to the public, in
press releases and SEC ﬁlings, the progress of Erbitux development and the ongoing eﬀorts to acquire FDA
approval.157 In addition to rosy statements of the drug’s potential, the company made speciﬁc reference
to numerous preclinical and clinical trials purporting to demonstrate the drug’s safety and eﬃcacy. Even
students of science and statistics could be excused for getting swept up in the seemingly promising results,
and no doubt they contributed to the steady rise of ImClone’s stock price. Nonetheless, in its RTF letter the
FDA noted a failure by ImClone to abide by standard scientiﬁc protocol in the design and implementation
of the 9923 study, and in data analysis for that study. This illustrates quite clearly that the results of studies
are meaningless if those studies are poorly executed, but in many situations – including ImClone’s, perhaps
– the ﬂaws behind the numbers are not discovered until well after the fact. There is clearly a need to ensure
153In re Synergen, Inc. Sec. Litig., 863 F. Supp. at 1418 citing In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d
Cir. 1993).
154Id., 863 F. Supp. at 1417 citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 108 (1988), and TSC Indus., Inc. v. Norhway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 96 (1976).
155Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 at 2760 (1991).
156Walsingham v. Biocontrol Tech., Inc., 66 F.Supp. 2d 669, 676 (W.D.Pa. 1998) citing Isquith v. Middle South Utilities,
Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1988), and SEC v. C.R. Richmond & Co., 565 F.2d 1101, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1977).
157ImClone’s 1999 and 2000 Annual Reports comment on the results of clinical trials, and the intention to seek marketing
approval, but no data is disclosed, and discussions of commercialization are well qualiﬁed. Consequently, they will not be
discussed.
33that data and statistics are presented with suﬃcient supplementary information to put them in context, and
adequately caution investors of uncertainties.
The experience of ImClone and other companies provide some insight into the scope and content of infor-
mation necessary to make disclosures concerning drug development as informative as possible, while still
protecting the proprietary information of the company. In a recent article, William Fisher notes three areas
of disclosures that may create problems in the process of drug development: (1) statements about the chances
of FDA approval; (2) disclosure of clinical test results; and (3) statements about communications with FDA
before approval.158 Each of these may give rise to civil liability, and SEC litigation.
Predictions of FDA Approval
Companies are under no obligation to project the likelihood of FDA approval, but often do so anyway,
ostensibly to keep shareholders informed, and probably to drum up anticipation in the market.159 Congress
and the courts have created a high threshold for establishing liability in the case of predictions of future
events, such as FDA approval, where some precautions are taken by the company. In addition to the pre-
existing burdens on plaintiﬀ’s in 10b-5 lawsuits, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) may
broaden the protection for company disclosures. Fisher argues that, though not explicitly included in the
PSLRA’s deﬁnition of “forward-looking statement,” projections of FDA approval “could certainly be phrased
as an ‘objective of management,’ and could also be disclosed as an assumption underlying predicted future
158Fisher, William O., “Key Disclosures Issues for Life Sciences Companies: FDA Product Approval, Clinical Test Results,
and Government Inspections,” 8 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 115 (2002), 116-117. Though Fisher does not discuss
ImClone, much of the this section borrows from his very insightful article. Fisher also deals with a fourth topic – “Disclosing
and Commenting on Government Inspections, Investigations and Prosecutions – which is not implicated in the ImClone case.
159Id. at 117-118, footnote 4.
34ﬁnancial performance.”160 In addition to requiring plaintiﬀ’s to prove the company had “actual knowledge”
that the prediction was false or misleading, the PSLRA further provides a statutory safe harbor from private
actions where a qualifying forward looking statement is accompanied by “meaningful” cautionary language
identifying important factors that could cause variations from the predicted result.161 What constitutes
“meaningful” cautionary language is still up in the air, but at least one court concluded that the statement
that a company believed its FDA application was “on track for approval this year” was not actionable where
accompanied by language indicating the uncertainties of the FDA approval process, and the possibility that
approval may not be granted.162 That case adopted the approach of MedImmune, decided prior to the
PLSRA, in which the court stated that “while it is true that a ‘guarantee’ of approval of a product by a
federal agency might be actionable, the key word is ‘guarantee.”’163 In MedImmune the court – noting
that the defendant qualiﬁed most references to FDA approval with “variations of the proviso ‘if and when
approved by FDA”’ – maintained that “[m]ere expressions of hope or expectation regarding future approval
...are not actionable.”164 The safe harbor does have limits, however, and Fisher cautions companies to
consider disclosing any facts that could aﬀect FDA approval, including the possibility that the company and
the agency will have diﬀering interpretations of clinical test results, and the potential for human error in the
conduct and evaluation of trials that could alter future results.165
ImClone’s press releases carry with them a standard warning about forward looking statements, which states
160Id. at 119, footnote 10.
161Cox, James D. et al. Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials (3d ed.). Aspen Law & Business (New York, 2001), at 74.
162In re PLC Systems, Inc. Sec. Litig., 41 F. Supp. 2d 106, 117-118 (D. Mass. 1999) (pointing out that statements of possible
FDA approval were qualiﬁed using words such as “believe” and “expect.”).
163In re MedImmune, Inc. Sec. Litig., 873 F. Supp. 953 (D. Md. 1995) at 964 (internal citation omitted); In re PLC
Systemes, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 118.
164In re MedImmune, Inc. Sec. Litig., 873 F. Supp. at 964.
165Fisher, 8 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 115 at 123, and 126-127 citing In re Cell Pathways, Inc. Sec. Litig., Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P91,001 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2000) (holding that cautionary language does not protect a forward looking
statement where the plaintiﬀs “allege omission of the facts causing predictions to fail rather than attacking the predictions as
aﬃrmative misstatements”).
35that “[a]ctual results may diﬀer materially from those predicted in such forward-looking statements due to
the risks and uncertainties inherent in the Company’s business ...,” and mentions several non-inclusive
factors aﬀecting future results including “risks and uncertainties in obtaining and maintaining regulatory
approval.”166 Beginning with its May 22, 2000 press release, ImClone added a new warning to its Erbitux
related disclosures:
Imclone Systems’ IMC-C225 [Erbitux] is an investigational drug currently being evaluated in clinical
trials. The determination of the safety and eﬀectiveness of this product is subject to evaluation by
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). FDA has not reviewed or determined that the
information in IMC-C225 is suﬃcient for approval.167
Curiously, this warning only appeared in relevant press releases through the end of 2000, and only one of
those releases – from November 8, 2000 – discussed the prospect of FDA licensing. The November release
quotes Harlan Waksal, commenting on preliminary results from the 9923 study, as saying, “data are being
prepared as expeditiously as possible for review by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and we expect
to submit a ﬁling in the ﬁrst half of 2001.”168 The warning does not appear in a March 26, 2001 release in
which Harlan Waksal was again quoted as saying the company was “preparing data from [9923 study] for a
ﬁling with the FDA in the ﬁrst half of this year.”169 Nor does it appear in the February 1, 2001 press release
announcing that FDA had granted Erbitux fast-track designation, or in the June 28, 2001 and November 1,
2001 releases announcing, respectively, the initial ﬁling and the completion of the Erbitux rolling BLA.170 It
166Press Releases, ImClone Systems, Inc., available at http://www.imclone.com/news.
168Press Release, ImClone Systems, Inc., ImClone Systems Announces Favorable Preliminary Results in Phase II
Study of IMC-C225 and Irinotecan in Patients with Refractory Colorectal Carcinoma (Nov. 8, 2000), available at
http://www.imclone.com/news.
169Press Release, ImClone Systems, Inc., ImClone Systems Presents Preclinical Data on Anti-Tumor Activity of IMC-C225 in
Combination with Chemotherapy in Colorectal Carcinoma (March 26, 2001), available at http://www.imclone.com/news.
170Press Releases, ImClone Systems, Inc., ImClone Systems Incorporated Receives fast track Designation for IMC-C225 From
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (Feb. 1, 2001), ImClonse Systems Initiates Filing of Rolling Biologic License Application
with the FDA for Approval of IMC-C225 to Treat Refractory Colorectal Cancer (June 28, 2001), ImClone Systems and Bristol-
Myers Squibb Announce Completion of Rolling Biologics License Application Filing for ERBITUX, Formerly IMC-C225, to
Treat Irinotecan-Refractory Colorectal Carcinoma (Nov. 1, 2001), available at http://www.imclone.com/news.
36is not clear why the warning appeared for such a short period of time, though it may have been superﬂuous.
None of ImClone’s press statements contain anything resembling a “guarantee” of FDA approval, and the
hazards of the regulatory approval process are mentioned in the company’s standard warning on forward
looking statements.
Similarly cautious language exists in ImClone’s annual 10-K ﬁlings with SEC. In addition to noting the
complexities of the FDA approval process, the company acknowledges that it “has limited experience in
conducting and managing preclinical testing necessary to enter clinical trials required to obtain government
approvals and has limited experience in conducting clinical trials,” and therefore “the Company’s competitors
may succeed in obtaining FDA approval for products more rapidly than the Company, which could adversely
aﬀect the Company’s ability to further develop and market its products.”171 The company is also careful
to qualify statements concerning FDA approval, using language such as “when and if we receive ...required
regulatory approvals,”172 and noting that “[t]here can be no assurance that we will receive regulatory approval
for IMC-C225 [Erbitux] based on the results of our ongoing Phase II clinical trials or any of our other ongoing
or anticipated IMC-C225 clinical trials.”173 In its 2001 10-K, ImClone does comment on its marketing
intentions for Erbitux “[u]pon the receipt of regulatory approval,” where cautionary language concerning the
prospects for approval only appears later in the report.174 There is no rule setting out the required proximity
of cautionary language to forward looking statements, but it is possible a court could ﬁnd such warnings
inadequate where suﬃciently removed from a material misrepresentation. In all likelihood, however, this is
not such a case.
It seems, therefore, that ImClone maintained a reasonable degree of caution in making statements concerning
the prospects of Erbitux approval. Although numerous reports outside the company predicted FDA would
171ImClone Systems, Inc., Form 10-K 10-11, F-7 (March 1998), Form 10-K 14-15, F-7 (March 1999). Form 10-K 3, 14, F-7
(March 2000); Form 10-K 17-18, F-7 (March 2001).
172ImClone Systems, Inc., Form 10-K 1 (March 1999).
173ImClone Systems, Inc., Form 10-K 3 (March 2000).
174ImClone Systems, Inc., Form 10-K 1, 17-18, F-7 (March 2001).
37grant a license, it is diﬃcult to see how the company could be held liable on these grounds.
Revealing Results
Risks associated with forward-looking statements exist for any publicly traded company, but biotechnology
and pharmaceutical companies also have the more unusual problem of relying on trial data to support
many of their disclosures. Diﬃculties created by diﬀering interpretations of data are bad enough, but the
problem is often compounded because companies may release preliminary results, before the study is even
complete. ImClone revealed much of its preclinical and clinical trial results at the annual meetings of the
American Association for Cancer Research, the American Society of Clinical Oncology, and the American
Society for Therapeutic Radiology. These announcements were accompanied by company Press Releases,
often including statements from company oﬃcials. The mix of raw data and interpretive statements in the
ImClone disclosures exempliﬁes the typical problem life science companies face. To make such information
accessible to the masses, companies may prefer to simply comment on results, without presenting data that
could be misconstrued, or at least provide explanations to accompany the data. In doing so, however,
the company risks making statements that could be misinterpreted, and render the disclosure misleading.
Consequently, a company may decide to simply present the “hard” information to avoid the risk of making
misleading statements. This, of course, renders the company subject to claims that insuﬃcient context was
provided to allow investors to accurately interpret the information.
The use of data is not necessarily problematic, however in a world seemingly run by opinion polls, there
may be a tendency to take statistics at face value, and fail to question the assumptions behind the numbers.
38The possibility for data to be misused, or at least misleading, is exempliﬁed by two ImClone press releases
dated March 26, 2001. In one release, ImClone presented data from a preclinical study showing that 43
of 50 (86%) primary colorectal carcinoma tumors “demonstrated positive EGFR membrane staining.” As
the cell membrane protein that Erbitux interacts with, EGFR must be present for Erbitux to be eﬀective.
In the other release, the company states that Erbitux “is designed to target and block the Epidermal
Growth Factor Receptor (EGFR), which according to studies, can be expressed in as much as 86 percent of
colorectal carcinoma” (emphasis added). However the American Cancer Society reported in 2000 that only
25-77 percent of colorectal cancers express EGFR (ImClone website info on Erbitux). It appears, therefore,
that the company is announcing research results in one breath, and citing those results as gospel in the next.
The statement may be literally true, but it is hardly the hallmark of the scientiﬁc process of peer review.
In revealing trial results, companies run the risk that later trials, or even later analysis of the same trial,
will render the original disclosure inaccurate. Fisher notes that it is important for courts to keep in mind
that results are open to interpretation, and though FDA may ﬁnd data submitted to be inadequate, this
does not mean the company did not interpret, announce, and submit the results in good faith.175 In Padnes
v. Scios, the defendant made several announcements concerning a Phase II study to the eﬀect that, among
other things, its experimental drug, Auriculin, had a “statistically signiﬁcant reduction in the number of
patients requiring dialysis.”176 Plaintiﬀ’s found fault in this and other statements, and argued that, while
factually accurate, the company’s disclosure was improper because, among other things, it failed to note
that the study was randomized or double-blind, and “the diﬀerence in the dialysis rates between surviving
control-group and surviving treatment-group patients was not statistically signiﬁcant”177 The court noted
that “[r]easonable minds could diﬀer with respect to the value of the [Phase II] study,” but, citing In re
MedImmune, ruled that:
175Fisher, 8 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 115 at 143-144.
176Padnes v. Scios Nova, Inc., 1996 WL 539711 at *2 (emphasis added, quoting Scios Nova’s 1993 Annual Report).
177Id., 1996 WL 539711 at *2 (emphasis added).
39...where a company accurately reports the results of a scientiﬁc study, it is under no obligation
to second-guess the methodology of that study. Medical researchers may well diﬀer with respect
to what constitutes acceptable testing procedures, as well as how best to interpret data garnered
under various protocols. The securities laws do not impose a requirement that companies report
only information from optimal studies, even if scientists could agree on what is optimal. Nor do they
require that companies who report information from imperfect studies include exhaustive disclosures
of procedures used, including alternatives that were not utilized and various opinions with respect
to the eﬀects of these choices on the interpretation of the outcome data.178
40MedImmune also involved announcements concerning the results from a clinical trial. The company and
its representatives made numerous statements, prior to the release of any trial data, about the importance
of the trial results, including that “results of treatment ...were highly statistically signiﬁcant along all
of the eﬃcacy parameters,” and that “[w]e are quite enthusiastic about the results from the study and
their implications for preventing [respiratory syncytial virus].”179 Plaintiﬀs argued that such statements
were materially misleading because ﬂaws in the study design made it impossible to deﬁnitively establish
the eﬃcacy of the drug.180 The court, however, concluded that although FDA raised questions about
the results, the “[d]efendants and their aﬃliates developed data which they believed supported their
conclusions regarding the drug’s eﬃcacy.”181 Similarly, in In re Biogen Securities Litigation, Biogen
made several disclosures concerning results of a Phase II study of Hirulog – an anti-clotting agent
– including a press release in which the company stated the study “showed a signiﬁcant reduction
in death and heart attacks among patients treated with Hirulog.”182 What the company failed to
mention was that the study results were not signiﬁcant for any of the prospectively deﬁned “endpoints,”
and the only successful endpoint – reduction in death and heart attacks in subsection of the patient
population receiving a high dose of the drug – was identiﬁed after the study, and data analysis, were
complete.183 Nevertheless, the court granted summary judgment for the defendant with respect to
the press release, noting that Biogen did disclose that none of the four primary endpoints was met;
ﬁnding immaterial the drug’s failure to meet the 24 secondary endpoints. The court also concluded that
failure to disclose the retrospective nature of the “successful” endpoint was not enough to demonstrate
fraud or recklessness required for liability.184 More recently, the court in DeMarco v. DepoTech Corp.
dismissed plaintiﬀ’s 10b-5 claims regarding statements made by the defendant about the prospects for
its experimental product, DepoCyt, a type of DepoFoam.185 In its 1996 10-K, the company stated that
it believed the product “will add additional value to [existing] drugs,” “[e]nhance the safety and eﬃcacy”
of existing drugs, and “may allow such drugs to be used in indications where they cannot currently be
used because of the limitations of current delivery methods.186 Plaintiﬀ’s also pointed to statements
by DepoTech’s then President and CEO to the eﬀect that DepoCyt would improve patients quality
of life relative to current treatments, and a 1996 SEC Registration Statement in which the company
also touted the safety and eﬃcacy of DepoFoam.187 The court pointed to several factors in rejecting
plaintiﬀ’s contentions. It noted that, while some evidence suggested problems, there was “ample factual
support for Defendant’s optimistic statements.”188 The court also noted that plaintiﬀ’s concerns about
toxicity problems “amount[ ] to little more than hindsight-based criticism and speculation,” and that
while plaintiﬀ’s pointed to a valid diﬀerence of opinion as to the proper analysis of the data, it was
insuﬃcient to support a claim for securities fraud.189
41Several ImClone press releases comment on the results of Erbitux preclinical trials, some in which little or
no data are actually presented. In response to results of a preclinical study for which no data was disclosed,
ImClone scientists were quoted as saying “The activity of C225 [Erbitux] as a single agent in these xenograft
studies is quite remarkable.”190 In a later release in which two preclinical trials were discussed, with some
data presented for one of the two trials, Sam Waksal stated, “These data in pancreatic cancer models provide
further evidence that C225 as a single therapy or in combination with standard therapies can inhibit the
growth and spread of a wide variety of cancer cells ....”191 It is notable, however, that no reports of clinical
trial results were found that did not include hard data concerning the percent, and often the actual number,
of patients responding to therapy.
Similar problems arise from the publication of “hard” information such as rates of response and statistical
signiﬁcance, and study protocols. In this context courts seem to ﬁnd it especially important that companies
adequately deﬁne any potentially confusing technical information. In denying defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment in In re Synergen, Inc. Securities Litigation, the court concluded that the presentation of
data on patient mortality in two contexts, without additional clariﬁcation, might have confused investors.192
Defendants presented information on the number of patients that died during the 28-day trial (mortality
rate), and the aﬀect of higher dosage on the number of days a patient lived during the trial (survival curve),
and reported that as to the survival curve there was a statistically signiﬁcant response with p = 0.015. The
court agreed with the plaintiﬀ’s that an investor might have concluded that the measure of signiﬁcance, p
= 0.015, applied to the 28-day mortality rate, as well as the survival curve.193 By contrast, in DeMarco v.
190Press Release, ImClone Systems, Inc., ImClone Systems Incorporated Reports Data on its Cancer Therapeutic, C225 at
American Association for Cancer Research Meeting (March 31, 1998), available at http://www.imclone.com/news.
191Press Release, ImClone Systems, Inc., ImClone Systems’ Lead Cancer Therapeutic, C225, Demonstrates Anti-Tumor Ac-
tivity in Preclinical Models of Pancreatic Carcinoma (April 14, 1999), available at http://www.imclone.com/news.
192In re Synergen, Inc. Sec. Litig., 863 F. Supp. at 1419.
193Id., 863 F. Supp. at 1419.
42DepoTech Corp., defendant won a summary judgment motion against charges that investors were misled by
the announcement of interim study results because the company used a diﬀerent deﬁnition of “response”
in reporting the interim results than was established in the original study protocol.194 The court noted
that each of the announcements explicitly deﬁned “response,” and that plaintiﬀ’s could not have relied on
the original protocol deﬁnition because it was not public at the time the data was announced.195 Fisher
suggests four things companies can do to limit the risks of securities lawsuits based upon disclosure of hard
information.196 First, clearly describe information provided, and deﬁne any important terms. Second, have
someone familiar with the trial protocol and results review disclosures before they are released. Third, avoid
impromptu answers to questions from the media or investors. And ﬁnally, take aﬃrmative steps to correct
incorrect information reported by analysts or the media.
ImClone frequently revealed trial data for Erbitux in press releases that demonstrate some of the diﬃculties
Fisher discusses. For example, in a Press Release for May 17, 1999, ImClone announced a 66 percent re-
sponse rate for patients in a Phase Ib/IIa study of nine individuals with refractory advanced squamous cell
head and neck carcinoma treated with C225 in combination with cisplatin, a chemotherapy agent. Reading
further, however, the release notes that, while all six responders previously failed other treatment regimens,
only three of the responders were refractory for cisplatin. Apparently, though the release does not say so
explicitly, the other three responders were not refractory, meaning it would be impossible to determine if
the response was due to Erbitux or cisplatin. Furthermore, the release provides no information about the
treatment history of the three non-responders. The type of treatment previously received could aﬀect the
signiﬁcance of the results. Nonetheless, the release quotes Erbitux discoverer, and ImClone board member,
Dr. John Mendelsohn as saying, “The cisplatin study is a signiﬁcant step in the development of C225 [Er-
bitux] because of the impressive response rate and because we observed that patients who have progressed
194DeMarco v. DepoTech Corp., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1212.
195Id., 149 F. Supp. 2d at 1227-1228.
196Fisher, 8 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 115 at 158-159.
43after cisplatin therapy respond when it is then combined with C225.”197 A similar situation arises in a press
release a year later, in which ImClone announced the results of a clinical trial of Erbitux in combination with
cisplatin in 12 patients with head and neck carcinoma. The release states that all 12 patients responded, but
then mentions, almost as an aside, that while all 12 patients were “refractory or relapsed following treatment
with chemotherapy and/or radiation,” only a “majority” of the patients previously failed treatment with
cisplatin.198 Though there is no evidence that these disclosures are factually inaccurate, they seem to require
investors to read between the lines in order to glean the full signiﬁcance – or lack thereof – of the results.
These disclosures raise concerns, but it must be acknowledged, as Fisher points out, that revealing trial
results is a delicate balancing act between providing the investor enough information on which to buy or
sell, while simplifying the analysis to avoid confusion. ImClone sought to walk that line by providing trial
results, usually with some data and a simpliﬁed version of the trial protocol. In reporting data, the company
was also consistent in disclosing the level of response of patients, and what that meant. For example, press
releases announcing “partial” responses deﬁned the term as “greater than 50 percent tumor regression,”
which is the same deﬁnition agreed upon by ImClone and FDA in evaluating the 9923 trial.199 The com-
pany also provided data for baseline comparisons when, for instance, announcing results of Erbitux used in
combination with radiation therapy.200
While companies may choose to reveal test results, disclosure is usually not required; in some cases, however,
companies may be obligated to reveal such information where failure to do so would make other disclosures
197Press Release, ImClone Systems, Inc., ImClone Systems Presents Clinical Findings on C225 at American Society of Clinical
Oncology Meeting (May 17, 1999), available at http://www.imclone.com/news.
198Press Release, ImClone Systems, Inc., ImClone Systems Presents Preliminary Results on Major Responses Us-
ing IMC-C225 in Combination with Chemotherapy in Patients with Refractory Cancers (May 22, 2000), available at
http://www.imclone.com/news.
199Id.. See also Ron Winslow and Geeta Anand, Laboratory Mixup: A Novel Cancer Drug, A Big Biotech Deal, And Now a
Bitter Feud, supra Note 15.
200Press Releases, ImClone Systems, Inc., ImClone Systems Incorporated Reports Data on its Cancer Therapeutic, C225,
at American Society of Clinical Oncology Meeting (May 18, 1998), ImClone Systems Reports Data on Cancer Therapeutic,
C225, at Annual Meeting of the American Society for Therapeutic Radiation and Oncology (October 27, 1998), available at
http://www.imclone.com/news. Both releases note that published data for radiotherapy alone shows 30-40 percent response.
44misleading.201 This situation is most likely to arise in the case of negative test results that the company is
unlikely to want to disclose. Courts have found evidence of scienter suﬃcient to survive summary judgment
where the defendant knew of and failed to disclose negative test results while continuing to release positive
statements regarding the product.202 Courts have also found such circumstances to indicate materiality
suﬃcient to survive summary judgment. Fisher notes that, in this context, courts have equated the test
for materiality with determinations of statistical signiﬁcance.203 In Synergen, defendant made statements
to the eﬀect that the “[b]aseline characteristics were similar among treatment groups,” and therefore should
not be a factor in the study.204 In reviewing the results of the study, however, it was determined that, when
controlling for the diﬀerences that did exist between the control and the experimental groups, some results
went from being statistically signiﬁcant to being insigniﬁcant.205 In Walsingham, the court denied summary
judgment to the defendant where the company did not disclose trial results for its medical device, but made
positive statements about the device’s eﬃcacy before and after the trial was complete. The court empha-
sized that the device was “essentially” the company’s only product, and noted that some of the defendant’s
statements, made after the results were available, sought to rebuﬀ criticism of the product’s eﬀectiveness.206
Prior to the Erbitux rejection, ImClone failed to reveal at least two pieces of hard information that might
be considered material. First, the company did not disclose competing assessments of patient eligibility in
the pivotal 9923 trial that would – and according to the FDA did – dramatically aﬀect the signiﬁcance of
the results. Second, ImClone failed to disclose that, in light of the results of the single-agent study required
by FDA, there was no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the eﬀects of Erbitux when used alone, and when
used in concert with irinotecan in the 9923 trial.
201Fisher, 8 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 115 at 162-163.
202Walsingham v. Biocontrol Tech., Inc., 66 F.Supp. 2d 669, 675 (W.D.Pa. 1998); see also Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363,
1375-80 (9th Cir. 1994) quoted in In re Biogen Sec. Litig., 179 F.R.D. 25 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 1997) at 36.
203Fisher, 8 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 115 at 161-162.
204In re Synergen, Inc. Sec. Litig., 863 F. Supp. at 1416.
205Id., 863 F. Supp. at 1419.
206Walsingham v. Biocontrol Tech., Inc., 66 F.Supp. 2d at 677-678.
45Statements Concerning FDA Communications
Finally, problems may also arise when a company comments on communications with the FDA. During drug
development, companies may communicate frequently with the agency over the design and implementation of
trials, the results of those trials, and what more needs to be done for approval. Where FDA disagrees with the
company over the adequacy of a trial, or the interpretation of trial data, “management must decide whether
the FDA comments are material and whether the company’s positive report on the tests may be misleading if
the company does not give at least some warning of the FDA position.”207 In MedImmune, the court upheld a
motion for summary judgment where the company failed to disclose concerns that FDA expressed about study
design and implementation.208 Noting that “[c]ontinuous dialogue between the FDA and the proponent of a
new drug is the essence of the product license application process,” the court concluded “[m]ere questioning
by the FDA imposed no duty upon Defendants either to trim back their opinions as to the eﬃcacy of the
drug or to report to the public the FDA staﬀer’s questions as they arose.”209 The court further concluded
that “[r]equiring ongoing disclosure of FDA’s questions would not only be disruptive to the review process; it
could easily result in misleading the public more than not reporting the questions.”210 In particular, the court
pointed out that requiring disclosures of ongoing communications could send stock prices on a roller-coaster
ride as questions were raised and answered during the course of drug development.211 Courts have been
less forgiving, however, where company statements run more directly against FDA concerns. Despite ﬁnding
no duty to disclose concerns expressed by the agency, the MedImmune court denied defendant’s motion to
dismiss as to the company’s statement that there was “absolutely no question about eﬃcacy,” concluding
207Fisher, 8 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 115 at 166.
208In re MedImmune, Inc. Sec. Litig., 873 F. Supp. 953, 966 (D. Md. 1995).
209Id., 873 F. Supp. at 966.
210Id., 873 F. Supp. at 966.
211Id., 873 F. Supp. at 966; see also In re Biogen Sec. Litig., 179 F.R.D. 25 (D. Mass. 1997) (applying MedImmune where
FDA expressed concerns about the adequacy of trial results).
46that “it might well contain in its sweep a representation that the FDA had raised no question about the
eﬃcacy of the drug when in fact quite possibly it had.”212 The court noted that “it is one thing to declare
enthusiasm,” but “quite another to make a statement that ...[the drug] was unquestionably eﬃcacious,” and
such a statement might be misleading.213 Likewise, in In re British Biotech PLC, et al., the SEC concluded
that the company misled the public by continuing to make statements that the use of certain surrogate
endpoints in a clinical trial demonstrated the eﬃcacy of the drug against cancer, even after FDA sent the
company a Notice of Violation informing the company that such statements were misleading.214
FDA apparently expressed concerns about the 9923 trial as early as August 2000, when it met with ImClone
to discuss use of the trial to support a BLA.215 The extent to which these concerns were conveyed is not
clear. Although ImClone did not make statements to the public about its communications with FDA,
there is evidence that company management may have downplayed the signiﬁcance of FDA concerns in
communications with ImClone’s partners, and potential partners. The Preliminary Committee Staﬀ Report
quotes an email from an unnamed drug company in which a company oﬃcial states that, according to Harlan
Waksal:
FDA has agreed that while [the 0141 study] is necessary for ﬁling, it will not impact the approval of
the combination in refractory. They [FDA] need to have the single agent activity per their regulations.
They won’t use the small trial to compare RR [response rate] of the single agent to the combo, but
will use it to help plan further development of C225 as a single agent if appropriate.216
In fact, the agency did compare response rates of the 0141 and 9923 trials in evaluating the Erbitux ap-
plication, and the letter FDA sent requiring the study makes it clear that this is the point of the study.
212In re MedImmune, Inc. Sec. Litig., 873 F. Supp. at 967.
213Id., 873 F. Supp. at 967.
214In re British Biotech PLC, et al., SEC Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-9915).
215Report of Dr. Weiss, supra Note 55.
47Similarly, the report quotes an internal BMS email from October 12, 2001, citing Sam Waksal with regard
to the results of the 0141 trial:
I just had Sam Waksal on the phone re the single-agent data. Apparently it came out at 13% which
he feels is half the C225 plus CPT-11 data. They have informed the FDA who were “pleased”
and conﬁrmed that they would be on for the Feb 28 ODAC (FDA’s Oncologic Drugs Advisory
Committee). He reckons they will be on the market by March.217
But not only was FDA clearly not “pleased” by the results, in interviews by the staﬀ, and at the hearings,
no FDA personnel recalled speaking with Waksal about the results of the trial, and Erbitux was never on
the February 2002 agenda for the ODAC meeting.218
Part V: Going Forward
What Really Went Wrong?
Enthusiasm expressed by ImClone’s management, and the considerable media attention, certainly con-
tributed to investors overestimating the prospects for Erbitux. However both the company and the press
frequently noted the uncertainties of the FDA approval process. In its cover story on Erbitux, Business
Week pointed out that “a rule of thumb in the pharmaceutical industry is that only one out of 5,000 drug
candidates discovered in labs is commercialized.”219 “There is no guarantee that the FDA will approve the
drug,” the article noted, “The agency often asks for more data, adding many months to the process.” The
more likely candidates for misleading investors, it would seem, are ImClone’s agreement with Bristol-Myers
218Id.
219Catherine Arnst, supra Note 13.
48Squibb, and the company’s presentation of clinical trial results.
Certainly an important factor in the rise in ImClone’s stock price in the latter part of 2001 was the deal
with Bristol-Myers Squibb. Investors no doubt considered a $2 billion investment by one of the world’s most
respected pharmaceutical companies to be a strong endorsement of Erbitux. What investors were not aware
of were the serious concerns BMS had about the Erbitux BLA. Internal BMS communications indicate that
the company perceived several potential problems with the application: (1) BMS lacked data from the single
agent study, and no drug had ever been approved through fast track based solely upon data in combination
studies; (2) radiology review of 27 alleged responders in the 9923 study suggested the response rate could be
lower than the required 15 percent; and (3) the number of patients in the 9923 study meeting the eligibility
requirements might be below 100, making it unlikely the study could serve as the basis for an accelerated
approval application.220 There were also concerns that “the dose is questionable for refractory patients, and
the safety margin for the early stage patient, has not been determined.”221
But while BMS oﬃcials expressed some concerns that the venture was “a very high risk opportunity,” it
wasn’t until it re-examined the 9923 study data after the RTF letter that it recognized the severity of the
problems with the study.222 Defending BMS’s decision to invest at the Congressional hearing, Laurie Smal-
done of BMS testiﬁed, “[t]here was data that was conducted by reputable oncologists, already presented
to ASCO [American Society of Clinical Oncologists], which is a premier Scientiﬁc Congress for Oncology,
that validated our understanding of the data.”223 She also noted that while BMS due diligence revealed
some potential problems, ImClone was already in the fast track process, and in advanced discussions with
the FDA.224 Nonetheless, it is concerning that a company of the stature of BMS entered into a $2 billion
220Hearings, supra Note 18 at 45 (Preliminary Committee Staﬀ Report).
221Hearings, supra Note 18 at 93 quoting internal Bristol-Myers Squibb email.
222Peter Landers and Chris Adams, Potent Mix: Drug News, Stock Trading, Wall St. J., June 14, 2002, at C1; Hearings,
supra Note 18 at 44-45, 92.
223Hearings, supra Note 18 at 82 (Testimony of Laurie Smaldone, Senior Vice President, Global Regulatory Sciences, Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co.).
224Hearings, supra Note 18 at 82 (Testimony of Laurie Smaldone, Senior Vice President, Global Regulatory Sciences, Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co.).
49licensing agreement based upon such a basic misconception of either the data itself or its adequacy.
The ImClone aﬀair also raises serious questions about allowing companies to determine, more or less unfet-
tered, what trial results are released, when they are released, and how they are presented. It is true that
ImClone’s announcements are not unusual for a biotechnology company, nor was the company irrationally
exuberant – to borrow a phrase – in discussing trial results, and the future of Erbitux. When presenting data
from clinical studies the company generally provided response rates, basic protocol information, and often
other information to put the results in context.225 The company certainly put its best foot forward, but it
also consistently warned of the dangers of relying on forward-looking statements. Nor is it determinative
that later analysis of the 9923 study came to very diﬀerent conclusions. Disputes over the results of the
9923 study serve to illustrate the considerable subjectivity that can aﬀect data interpretation.226 While
the extent of disagreement may be unusual, study results are always open to interpretation. But the fact
that ImClone’s presentation of its data was not unusual, or necessarily inaccurate, does not mean it was
not misleading. Investors must make numerous assumptions about the conduct and analysis of clinical trials
that, in this case, turned out to be erroneous. When data for the 9923 study were initially disclosed at the
May 2001 annual meeting of the American Society of Clinical Oncology the presentation was limited, and
many of the key issues in the study were asserted by ImClone without proof, and remained unreviewed, and
225See Press Releases, ImClone Systems, Inc., ImClone Systems Incorporated Reports Data on its Cancer Therapeutic, C225,
at American Society of Clinical Oncology Meeting (May 18, 1998), ImClone Systems Presents Clinical Findings on C225 at
American Society of Clinical Oncology Meeting (May 17, 1999), ImClone Systems Presents Preliminary Results on Major
Responses Using IMC-C225 in Combination with Chemotherapy in Patients with Refractory Cancers (May 22, 2000), ImClone
Systems Presents Clinical Findings on the Follow Up of Patients Treated with IMC-C225 in Combination with Radiation
(May 23, 2000), ImClone Systems Announces Achievement of a 22.5 Percent Response Ratee in Its Phase II Clinical Study of
IMC-C225 and Chemotherapy in Patients with Refractory Colorectal Cancer (May 12, 2001).
226Report of Dr. Weiss, supra Note 55. Independent review of study data by the study investigators, by BMS, and by an
Independent Response Assessment Committee (IRAC) assembled by ImClone, revealed numerous disagreements. Overall, the
investigators reported 23 partial responses (greater than 50% regression), the IRAC reported 27 partial responses, and BMS
recategorized as “stable disease” 8 patients the IRAC labeled partial response. The IRAC and the investigators only agreed on
20 patients with partial response. The IRAC and BMS only agreed on 16 patients with partial response. There were also 38
patients where the category of the disease status prior to study entry (ie, progressive or stable) was in disagreement between
IRAC and the investigators.
50uncontroverted, until the FDA issued the RTF letter seven months later.227 This may create an undue sense
of credibility that could mislead investors.
Revamping the Approval Process and Improving Monitoring
These and other concerns surfaced in the wake of the Erbitux rejection and the subsequent investigations,
and Congress and the FDA have since sought to address many of them. The June 2002 reauthorization of the
Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 (PDUFA) requires CBER and CDER to draft a joint guidance on how
the FDA deﬁnes good review management principles, and emphasizes the need for eﬀective communications
between the agency and drug sponsors.228 The FDA also agreed to increased meetings with companies
in which minutes are kept, and during which agency oﬃcials oﬀer “the best interpretation we can along
scientiﬁc lines and medical lines of what we expect the company to do.”229
In September 2002, the FDA undertook a plan to transfer review of “certain therapeutic biologics from
CBER to CDER,” including review of monoclonal antibodies such as Erbitux.230 The consolidation will also
move several hundred employees from CBER to CDER. FDA Deputy Commissioner Lester Crawford testiﬁed
that he concluded such consolidation “would promote eﬃciency and consistency within the agency.”231 FDA
announced completion of the ﬁnal phase of planning for the consolidation on March 17, 2003, and set a target
implementation date of June 30, 2003.
These changes do not alter the basic authority of the FDA, however, and aside from hopefully creating
more consistency in the drug approval process – certainly an important goal – do not help to prevent future
227Press Release, ImClone Systems, Inc., ImClone Systems Announces Achievement of a 22.5 Percent Response Rate in its
Phase II Clinical Study of IMC-C225 and Chemotherpy in Patients with Refractory Colorectal Cancer, supra Note 68. See also
Report of Dr. Weiss, supra Note 55.
228Hearings, supra Note 18 at 227-228.
229Id. at 229 (Testimony of Dr. Lester Crawford, Deputy Director, Food and Drug Administration).
230Id. at 228 (Testimony of Dr. Lester Crawford, Deputy Director, Food and Drug Administration).
231Id. at 228 (Testimony of Dr. Lester Crawford, Deputy Director, Food and Drug Administration).
51disasters of the type Erbitux created. More must be done, therefore, to ensure that history does not repeat
itself.
The problems presented by the BMS agreement are probably impossible to police. The decision to enter into
a licensing agreement is purely the company’s, and the fact that its due diligence was inadequate, or that
management made a bad judgment call, is not in the purview of the SEC – absent breach of management’s
duty of care – much less the FDA. The SEC does require that companies reveal some information about
such transactions, but it cannot require disclosure of every internal memo expressing doubt or concern. To
do so would deter companies from sharing conﬁdential information in the ﬁrst place, and add even more
uncertainty to collaborative agreements. The reality is that some risk and uncertainty is a part of investing,
and is probably better dealt with by individual investors diversifying their portfolios than by requiring
disclosure of every minutiae of a company’s aﬀairs.
Problems presented by the announcement of clinical trial results may be easier to address, though they cannot
be eliminated. To help resolve this problem a company choosing to present data documenting response rates
could be required to provide other information to put those results in context. For example, basic statistical
analysis along with an explanatory note about the uncertainties of such analysis, and of data interpretation,
would give investors a more accurate picture of the importance of trial data. The FDA or SEC might
mandate a cookie-cutter disclaimer for all disclosures of trial data, akin to the Surgeon General’s warning on
packs of cigarettes. Requiring certain contextual information about related therapies – whether part of the
study or not – would also help by giving investors a basis of comparison. These solutions will not eliminate
the heavy reliance on data, but they should reduce the uncertainty.
Of course it is still not clear whether the FDA or the SEC should be responsible for enforcement. Disclosures
made prior to the initiation of FDA review of a licensing application will be diﬃcult, if not impossible for
that agency to police, and therefore the SEC seems the more natural choice. The SEC, however, could
52not be expected to pass on the scientiﬁc accuracy of many disclosures. A compromise might give the SEC
primary authority to monitor disclosures, but require companies to simultaneously submit to the FDA data
in support of any clinical trial results the company chooses to announce. All of this data will eventually be
disclosed if the company seeks marketing approval, so the requirement should not impose an excessive burden
on companies. Nor would the FDA be required to review the information at the time of the announcement,
but the agency would have easy access to the data should it, or the SEC, determine something might be
amiss in a company’s disclosures. This is not a sure-ﬁre solution, and it would certainly require increasing
the FDA’s resources, but it might force companies to be more discreet when discussing study results.
Again, however, it must be noted that regulatory oversight has its limits. No matter how much information
investors are provided with, they still rely on the company to ensure the information is accurate, and no
matter how much the FDA chooses to regulate the development of clinical trials, it cannot see to it that
protocol is always followed, and data always properly documented. The lesson of the ImClone aﬀair may be
that investors should be more cautious, and recognize the considerable uncertainty and complexity inherent
in drug development. Biotechnology stocks are not for the faint of heart, and risk-averse investors must take
adequate precautions by diversifying their portfolios, or simply avoiding the biotech sector all together.
At the congressional hearings, it was suggested that perhaps the FDA should be less restrained in its ability
to disclose information to the public. This would require some changes to current law to loosen disclosure
rules. Doing so could help in the future, but it has several limitations. First, expanding the FDA’s authority
would not aﬀect disclosures made by companies prior to the commencement of FDA review. Second, as
already discussed, the FDA would be hard pressed to muster the resources to take on the task of monitoring
company disclosures.232 Third, disclosure of information before the FDA is able to fully review and evaluate
an application could do more harm than good to the goal of certainty in ﬁnancial markets.233 Because some
232Geeta Anand and Chris Adams, ImClone Incident Spurs Demands For Greater Disclosure From FDA, supra Note 5 citing
an FDA oﬃcial.
233Id.
53applications, including ImClone’s are submitted piecemeal over a period of months, data acquired early on
could be negated by data received later, and requiring the agency to reveal such data could send biotech
stocks on a roller coaster ride. However more limited disclosure might be appropriate once the application is
complete and agency oﬃcials have taken a preliminary pass at the data. In particular, the FDA should not
sit on a ﬁnal decision to issue an RTF letter any longer than absolutely necessary; a problem that hopefully
will be eliminated when review is consolidated in CDER.234
As noted earlier, however, the FDA already has the tools to deal with many of the problems of the sort
ImClone raised. The agency could be more aggressive in issuing public rebukes, as it did in the SuperGen
case.235 It could also rely more on the SEC. Dr. Crawford testiﬁed that the FDA has undertaken “a
systematic review” of the its interactions with the SEC, which hopefully will put in place procedures to
address future problems.236 The role of the SEC may be further enhanced by changes being considered by
that agency. The ImClone aﬀair has prompted the SEC to take another look at the types of disclosures it
requires from companies. The agency is considering requiring companies to disclose some of the content of
discussions with the FDA in Form 8-K reports.237 Extending reporting requirements to include this type of
information could prove beneﬁcial, but it will likely be diﬃcult to clearly deﬁne the boundaries of required
disclosure. The deﬁnition of materiality in this context must be carefully delineated to include serious FDA
concerns, but exclude routine agency suggestions and requests for information. Litigation will certainly
ensue.
234Geeta Anand, Jerry Markon and Chris Adams, Biotech Bust: ImClone’s Ex-CEO Arrested, Charged With Insider Trading,
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54The Future of ImClone and Erbitux
Things only seemed to get worse for ImClone after Erbitux was rejected, and 2002 was a tumultuous year for
the company. In March 2002, ImClone announced it had agreed to revised terms for its licensing agreement
with BMS that substantially reduced future incentive payments.238 Several magazines and newspapers ran
stories alleging Sam Waksal had a history of improper behavior in the scientiﬁc community, and was forced
to leave several labs for a variety of reasons, including misleading and falsiﬁed scientiﬁc work.239 Dr. Waksal
resigned from ImClone in May, and in October pled guilty to six of the 13 counts against him for insider
trading and other crimes.240 ImClone has sued Sam Waksal to recover money paid him in his separation
agreement with the company, because of his failure to cooperate with the investigation into his conduct.241
But ImClone is taking steps to right itself. It has created a Disclosure Committee to review public disclosures
and ensure they are appropriate, and adopted a code of business conduct and ethics.242 In April of 2002 the
ImClone board adopted new policies requiring 16 oﬃcers to ﬁle reports of their transactions under SEA §16,
and ending consulting arrangements with directors.243 The company also put in place procedures to comply
with the Sarbanes-Oxley law.244
Things are even looking up for Erbitux. Despite the FDA rejection, Erbitux is not without its proponents,
and even FDA oﬃcials admitted the failure of the company’s BLA was more about the conduct of its trial
238Press Release, ImClone Systems, Inc., ImClonse Systems and Bristol-Myers Squibb Announce Revised Terms of Commer-
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55than the quality of its drug. ImClone has undertaken several Phase II and III clinical trials of Erbitux
alone and in conjunction with other drugs. The results of a 330 patient study in refractory colorectal cancer
patients, conducted by ImClone’s European partner Merck KGaA will be announced at this year’s annual
meeting of the American Society of Clinical Oncology in June.245 Two thirds of the patients received Erbitux
and irinotecan, and the other third received only Erbitux.246 In a statement, Merck KGaA’s Chief Executive
Bernhard Scheuble said a recent assessment of trial data by independent scientists left the company optimistic
that it would ﬁle for European regulatory approval this year.247 “The good result from the external review
was as expected, because why should an external review give a diﬀerent view than an internal one?”248
Perhaps he should ask Sam Waksal.
245Merck KGaA is unrelated to the American drug company, Merck.
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